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ABSTRACT 
AN INVESTIGATION OF RISK BEHAVIOR 
IN FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING 
FEBRUARY 1993 
KATHRYN T. SULLIVAN, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF LOWELL 
M.S., SIMMONS COLLEGE 
M.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF LOWELL 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Nelson J. Lacey 
This study examines individual decision making in financial contexts. Specifically, 
the study investigates basic propositions of Prospect Theory [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] 
in a variety of decision making contexts that are often faced by corporate managers. In 
addition, the research explores the effects of ruinous losses, multiple reference points, and 
prior gains and losses on financial decision making. It was hypothesized that (1) decision 
makers’ risk behavior will be risk avoiding in gain situations and risk seeking in loss 
situations, (2) prior gains and losses will differentially impact risk taking/avoiding behavior, 
(3) decision makers will switch from risk seeking to risk avoiding in the presence of ruinous 
losses (i.e. bankruptcy), and (4) managers’ risky behavior will be affected by both target and 
current levels of performance. 
Seven experiments were conducted which required experienced corporate managers 
to choose between alternative investment proposals that varied in their degree of risk. 
From these choices, risk taking or avoiding behavior was inferred. Results indicated that 
financial managers exhibit risk taking as well as risk avoiding behavior. Across a variety of 
investment settings, experienced managers display an underlying tendency towards risk 
avoidance. However, decision contexts that clearly involve financial losses or offer returns 
v 
well below potential reference points result in risk taking behavior. In addition, risk 
behavior was influenced by various contextual factors. The presence of prior outcomes 
affected risky choices, with greater risk avoidance occurring when prior losses were recently 
experienced. Managers also switched from risk taking when faced with loss alternatives, to 
risk avoiding when those losses potentially became ruinous. Finally, corporate managers’ 
risk behavior was influenced by the joint consideration of both current and target levels of 
performance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most fundamental issues in financial decision making concerns behavior 
under conditions of risk. Much of the financial research on risk behavior has focused on 
the development of normative models. Thus, a primary emphasis has been to determine 
how individuals should make decisions in risky contexts. Alternatively, descriptive models 
of individual decision making may be investigated. In this line of inquiry, the aim is to 
obtain a better understanding of how individuals actually behave in risky decision contexts. 
The purpose of this study is to empirically examine individual decision making behavior 
under conditions of risk1. Specifically, the study investigates basic propositions of a 
behavioral decision model known as Prospect Theory [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] in a 
variety of decision making contexts that are often faced by corporate financial managers. 
In addition, contextual factors pertinent to risky decision making in finance, such as ruinous 
losses, multiple reference points, and prior gains and losses, are explored to further refine 
our understanding of risky decision processes. It is hoped that the combination of 
normative approaches traditionally used in finance and such descriptive research will provide 
a more complete appreciation of decision making under conditions of risk. 
In finance, our understanding of the decision making processes of corporate financial 
managers, bank loan officers, financial analysts, portfolio managers, and individual investors 
is shaped by various assumptions, some regarding an individual’s propensity to take risks, 
and others concerning the factors considered by decision makers when making decisions. 
For example, it is generally assumed that individual decision makers evaluate alternatives 
with respect to final wealth, and that they act in a risk averting manner. Since these 
assumptions regarding risk behavior carry implications for models of financial decision 
making, it is important to assess the conditions under which these assumptions hold. Is 
1 
behavior consistently risk averting, or does it display instances of risk seeking? If so, what 
causes behavior to change from risk averting to risk seeking? Do decision makers base 
judgments on final asset position, or do they select a reference point2 and classify outcomes 
as gains or losses from that reference point? What additional factors may influence risk 
behavior? If individual decision makers do not avoid risk in all cases, then an assumption 
of universal risk aversion may be inaccurate. A systematic examination of factors that 
influence risky choice can increase our understanding of individuals’ risk behavior. The 
integration of such considerations may lead to models of decision making under uncertainty 
that are more appealing to financial decision makers since the models will more accurately 
reflect decision makers’ risk perceptions. 
It should be noted that while descriptive models of decision making have not 
traditionally been investigated in finance, their importance has often been recognized. In 
a Financial Management Association presidential address focusing on capital budgeting 
research, Pinches [1982] emphasized the need to move beyond a focus on technique towards 
a broader perspective of actual decision making, and suggests that the decision process in 
practice is much more complicated than is assumed by the financially orientated capital 
budgeting literature. Weston [1981, p.18] suggests that increasing our understanding of 
business managers’ decision processes would aid in resolving certain key issues in finance, 
such as dividend payout and conglomerate mergers. Stiglitz [1988] highlights the importance 
of descriptive research when he states that "what firm managers mean by risk does not 
accord well with how models predict managers should use the term. . . . What is at issue 
is not just a matter of semantics; the information that firms gather for decision making is 
based on their view of the appropriate concept of risk" (p. 121). The role of the individual 
decision maker also warrants further study in the area of investment decision making. 
Farrelly [1980] notes that "financial researchers . . . have disregarded evidence on the 
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psychological aspects of decision making in financial markets. Such evidence is important 
to the valuation process,... [one way to understand the valuation process is by] probing the 
decision making processes of individuals'' (p. 15). These concerns provide motivation for 
this study. By investigating the potential contribution of behavioral decision theory to the 
understanding of individual decision making in finance, a broader perspective of decision 
making research in financial contexts may be achieved. 
Models of Decision Making 
The predominant model for decision making under uncertainty used in finance is 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT). This theory, first axiomized by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern [1947], holds that, if decision makers abide by certain axioms of behavior, they 
will make decisions in a manner consistent with the maximization of expected utility, and 
that their preferences over a set of outcomes can be expressed by a utility function. 
Expected Utility is a general theory that can encompass both risk averting and risk seeking 
behavior.3 There is no a priori basis for predicting the shape of an individual’s utility 
function. Thus, EUT gives little guidance in understanding how decisions are actually made; 
rather, the theory prescribes how an individual should behave, given the shape of his or her 
utility function. 
However, when EUT is used in finance to derive theoretical consequences, 
assumptions are usually made to give the theory empirical content. As mentioned above, 
two major assumptions typically made involve the use of final wealth position in evaluating 
outcomes, and the risk attitudes of decision makers. In the traditional application of EUT, 
it is assumed that outcomes are evaluated with respect to final asset position. Further, given 
that individuals generally prefer more to less, and that this preference increases at a 
decreasing rate, the utility function will be strictly concave and increasing. This final 
assumption implies that individuals exhibit overall risk aversion. 
3 
This conventional representation of EU choice, however, has not been found to be 
descriptively accurate of actual choice behavior [Schoemaker, 1982; Machina, 1987]. It has 
been demonstrated that individuals often fail to behave in a manner that is consistent with 
the axioms underlying EUT. For example, violations of independence, transitivity, and 
continuity have all been documented in the literature [Allais, 1953, 1979; Ellsberg, 1961; 
Tversky, 1969; Coombs, 1975]. Lopes [1983] suggests that, rather than implying irrationality 
on the part of decision makers, such violations of EUT could be the result of the axioms’ 
failure to accurately represent the world as the decision maker sees it, perhaps because the 
model oversimplifies the decision context. Decision makers, Lopes feels, may be "trying to 
consider facts about the world the axiom ignores (p. 141)." Expected Utility Theory’s 
weakness as a descriptive model has encouraged investigations into actual decision making 
processes, particularly with respect to questions concerning the impact of attitudes towards 
risk and risk perceptions on decision making. 
Two distinct approaches have been taken by researchers investigating the application 
of EUT. One approach generalizes the existing normative theories of decision making in 
a way that enables them to account for a wider variety of risk behaviors by reducing their 
reliance on certain tenuous behavioral assumptions. This work has sought to integrate the 
atypical behavior into the normative theory by eliminating or modifying axioms that are 
violated. The result is generalized versions of EUT, or Non-Expected Utility Theories [e.g. 
Becker and Sarin, 1987; Bell, 1982, 1985; Chew and MacCrimmon, 1979; Fishburn, 1984; 
Machina, 1982]. These theories are more general in that they remove the assumption of 
linearity in probabilities, from which most of the violations originate. 
An alternative approach focuses on the psychological processes of decision making, 
and develops descriptive theories of decision making. This research, primarily in the field 
of psychology, provides alternative descriptive models of behavior that explicitly take into 
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account observed behaviors. One of the most comprehensive descriptive theory is Prospect 
Theory (PT), developed by Kahneman and Tversky [1979], In PT, unlike EUT and its more 
generalized versions, individual preferences for risky or certain prospects are specified, a 
priori, to generally conform to a particular functional form. The value function, as it is 
referred to in PT, is S-shaped and is defined in terms of changes from a reference point in 
an attempt to more accurately reflect the descriptive reality of actual decision making 
behavior. In effect, the strength of PT is that it, a priori, considers risk tendencies. 
In PT it is assumed that the analysis of a prospect4 goes through two distinct phases. 
In the first phase, prospects are organized and reformulated in ways that simplify evaluation 
and choice. During this editing phase attributes are coded as gains or losses relative to 
some neutral reference point. The value function v(») [see figure 1] is defined in terms of 
the reference point, and measures the prospect’s deviations from the reference point, rather 
than final asset position. Kahneman and Tversky suggest that this reference point could 
represent one’s current status, one’s anticipated status, or some other psychologically 
significant point. For outcomes above the reference point, individuals tend to exhibit risk 
averting behavior, and when prospects fall below the reference point, individuals tend to 
become risk seeking. The representation of outcomes as changes with respect to a reference 
point is a significant aspect of PT. It allows the theory to accommodate what are known as 
framing effects, where the perspective from which alternatives are evaluated has an 
influence on choice. The value function also exhibits the characteristic of loss aversion. 
That is, a given change within the domain of losses will have a greater disutility associated 
with it than equivalent changes in the area of gains, resulting in a steeper curve below the 
reference point than above [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991]. 
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Value 
Source: Kahneman and Tversky [1979] 
Figure 1.1 
Prospect Theory’s Value Function 
In the second phase of evaluation proposed by PT, the edited outcomes are 
combined with a probability-related decision weighting function, that, in combination with 
the value function, results in an evaluation of the prospect. The decision weighting function, 
7r(*) [see figure 2], is not simply the perceived likelihood of the event. The hypothesized 
properties of this function are such that, in general, moderate and high probabilities are 
underweighed, while small probabilities are overweighed. However, discontinuities exist at 
both ends. Extremely small probabilities are either ignored or overweighed, whiJe extremely 
high probabilities tend to be treated as certain. The decision function also exhibits what is 
known as sub-certainty, the summation of the decision weights do not add up to one as they 
6 
Decision 
Weight 
7T (*) 
Source: Kahneman and Tversky [1979] 
Stated 
Probability, p 
Figure 1.2 
Prospect Theory’s Decision Weighting Function 
would if they were regular probabilities. Thus, we may say that the decision weighting 
function is non-linear in probabilities. 
In summary, PT highlights several implications with respect to how individuals make 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty. First, individuals evaluate outcomes in terms of 
changes in wealth, rather than final wealth, so the value function is defined as a relative 
measure. Second, these changes are with respect to some reference point. Outcomes above 
the reference point are viewed as gains, and outcomes below the reference point are seen 
as losses. Third, there is a difference in risk behavior on either side of the reference point; 
individuals will be risk seeking in the presence of losses, and risk averting in the presence 
of gains. 
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Specific Issues of Interest 
While PT predicts a number of potentially relevant characteristics of decision 
making, its postulates should not be uncritically assumed as relevant to financial decision 
makers. Prior research indicates that different patterns of behavior may be exhibited in 
different decision contexts. For example, the judgment heuristics employed by individuals 
performing generic tasks are not always apparent when decision makers perform familiar, 
realistic tasks [Smith and Kida, 1991; Edwards, 1983; Fischhoff, 1982]. Consequently, 
empirical investigations must be made in the context of interest. 
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, the study examines fundamental 
postulates of PT in a variety of contexts corporate managers often encounter. Second, a 
number of additional factors that potentially affect risky decision making in financial settings 
are examined. An investigation of these factors may further our understanding of risky 
decision making in general. Specifically, the study examines the following question derived 
from PT: Are financial decision makers generally risk averting for gains and risk seeking for 
losses? In addition, the following issues, which can provide evidence to extend descriptive 
theories of decision making, are investigated: What is the impact of multiple potential 
reference points on risk taking and risk averting behavior? Are financial decision makers 
risk averting in the presence of ruinous losses? Do prior gains or losses influence 
subsequent choice? Can risk behavior in specific situations be better understood by 
examining an individual’s perception of risk? 
As noted, rather than focusing on final asset position, Kahneman and Tversky 
postulated that decision makers consider changes in wealth relative to some reference point. 
The reference point is important since it is the point at which risk behavior is hypothesized 
to change from risk averting to risk seeking. In fact, Kahneman and Tversky state that "the 
location of the reference point and the manner in which choice problems are coded and 
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edited emerge as critical factors in the analysis of decisions" [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 
p. 288]. These issues are important since they imply that financial decision makers, such as 
corporate financial managers, may select investment alternatives that are risk taking in 
certain situations, and risk averting in others, depending upon their point of reference. 
Empirical investigation of these issues in financial contexts can yield a better understanding 
of financial decision making and may assist in the development more relevant normative 
models. 
An implication of the basic propositions of PT is that an individual’s choice is 
sensitive to the frame of the decision. A decision frame is generally defined as the 
perspective from which alternatives are evaluated. In PT this primarily involves how the 
decision problem is formulated in terms of gains and loses, or positive and negative changes, 
from the reference point. Choices that are identical in an expected utility sense, when 
presented using different frames, can result in dramatically different choices with respect 
to risk taking behavior. For example, Tversky and Kahneman [1981, 1986] report a classic 
framing experiment in which subjects are told that the outbreak of an Asian disease is 
expected to kill 600 people. They must choose one of two alternative treatment programs. 
In one experimental condition, alternative A results in 200 lives saved with certainty, while 
alternative B has a 1/3 probability of saving 600 lives and a 2/3 probability of saving none. 
In the other experimental group, alternative A states that 400 people will die with certainty, 
while alternative B indicates that there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die and a 2/3 
probability that 600 will die. Of course, the number of lives saved and lives lost are 
complementary, and in the final analysis, the certain options are identical for both groups, 
as are the probabilistic options. However, the use of different frames implicitly changes the 
reference point utilized by decision makers, resulting in the majority of subjects in the lives 
saved experimental group choosing alternative A (save 200 lives with certainty), and the 
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majority of subjects in the lives lost experimental group indicating a preference for 
alternative B (i.e., the risky option). The implications for financial decision making are 
readily apparent. If decision frames affect the option chosen, an alternative framing can 
artificially change decision behavior. For example, framing investment projects in terms of 
revenues generated versus costs saved could impact final judgments even though the net 
effect on a firm’s profit remains identical [Bower, 1970]. 
This study also explores additional factors that may extend our understanding of the 
relationship between reference points and risky choice. As originally formulated, PT 
hypothesizes a single neutral reference point that serves to frame prospects in terms of gains 
and losses. However, the way in which this point is determined within a given decision 
situation, and the factors that may cause it to change, are not clearly specified. Kahneman 
and Tversky [1979, p. 279] recognized the effect of additional variables on risky decision 
making, noting that "such perturbations can readily produce convex regions in the value 
function for gains and concave regions in the value function for losses." In effect, relevant 
contextual factors may alter an individual’s general tendency towards risk aversion for gains 
and risk seeking for losses. I argue that, in financial decision contexts, the presence of 
targets, the potential of ruinous loss, and the existence of prior gains and losses impact risky 
decision making. In addition, underlying behavioral characteristics, such as an individual’s 
perception of risk, may affect general risk tendencies. 
In financial contexts, decision makers such as financial managers often operate with 
a budget or target. In such circumstances, the budget offers a potentially relevant reference 
point in addition to the status quo (i.e. the current level of performance). It is unclear 
whether the findings from generic psychological studies, which indicate a single reference 
point with risk seeking below and risk averting above, are readily generalizable to 
professional settings. Rather, these more complex situations may result in the joint 
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consideration of multiple reference points. This study will therefore investigate risk taking 
behavior in the presence of multiple relevant reference points. 
The impact of ruinous loss considerations is also of particular interest to financial 
decision makers. Alternatives which may bring a company into bankruptcy may be viewed 
differently, producing alterations in general risk seeking behavior in the domain of losses. 
For example, Laughhunn, Payne, and Crum [1980] offer data suggesting that an individual 
faced with the prospect of ruinous loss may revert to risk averting behavior if the risk entails 
a drastic consequence, such as bankruptcy. In effect, for such real world decisions, a more 
elaborate model of risk taking may be needed, resulting in an extension of the basic theory. 
Another factor that is of interest in financial contexts concerns the effect of prior 
gains and losses. Thaler and Johnson [1990] note that recently experienced gains and losses 
impact risky behavior. Such effects can have important implications for financial decision 
making. For example, decision makers are told to disregard prior losses, or sunk costs, in 
their analysis of potential investment alternatives, and to focus solely on the incremental 
benefits that would result from the investment. In terms of selecting an appropriate 
investment alternative, it should not matter if a portfolio has experienced recent gains, or 
recent losses. However, Thaler and Johnson [1990] present evidence to suggest that there 
is an increase in risk taking in the presence of prior gains, and when prior losses are 
present, there is a tendency to select outcomes which offer the chance to break even. The 
impact of prior gains and losses on professional financial decision making will therefore be 
examined. 
Finally, an attempt will be made to uncover underlying cognitive factors which may 
account for individual risk seeking or risk averting behavior. Risk is far more 
multidimensional and complex than the risky choice models generally acknowledge. On a 
pragmatic, real-world level, risk can mean many things to an individual, and individual 
11 
differences can exist among decision makers facing the same set of circumstances. As with 
most behavioral decision making studies, investigations of PT reveal that a majority of 
decision makers are risk seeking for losses and risk averting for gains, but not all decision 
makers exhibit this behavior. How can we explain or account for this individual variation? 
To this end, the present study investigates managers’ risk perceptions and potential 
relationships between such perceptions and risk taking behavior in an effort to gain a deeper 
understanding of risky decision making. 
Overview of Study 
This study utilizes an experimental approach to investigate the implications of PT 
and the additional variables discussed above. Seven experiments were conducted. The 
experimental conditions involved choice contexts relevant to financial decision making. 
Experienced corporate managers were asked to chose among competing capital investment 
alternatives. Risk taking or avoiding was inferred from the managers’ choice behavior. In 
addition, subjects responded to a number of Likert-like scales in an attempt to capture their 
different risk perceptions. 
The second chapter contains a review of the relevant literature on Expected Utility 
Theory and Prospect Theory. It also contains a review of relevant empirical testing of these 
theories as well as work related to the additional factors examined. Chapter three discusses 
the hypotheses tested, the experiments conducted to examine those hypotheses, and 
experimental results. A summary and discussion of the findings is presented in chapter four. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews relevant literature on risky decision making. The first section 
discusses Expected Utility Theory, the second focuses on Prospect Theory, and the third 
reviews empirical testing of Prospect Theory. The fourth and final section discusses studies 
in various disciplines that relate to the additional factors under examination: ruinous loss 
considerations, prior gains and losses, multiple reference points, and risk perception. 
Expected Utility Theory 
In finance, the principal model of decision making under uncertainty is Expected 
Utility Theory (EUT). The origin of EUT can be traced to Bernoulli [1738/1954], who 
developed an early version of the theory in response to the St. Petersburg paradox.5 In the 
mid 1940’s, von Neumann and Morgenstern (VNM) [1947] presented a different framework 
for thinking about and measuring utility. Von Neumann and Morgenstern suggested that 
if behavior in risky situations followed certain behavioral axioms, then risky choices would 
be made in a manner consistent with the maximization of expected utility. In such 
situations, individual preferences over a set of probability measures defined on a set of 
outcomes will be expressed by a utility function.6 
Axiomatic Development of EUT 
The axiomatic basis of EUT has been developed by several researchers in addition 
to VNM, notably Arrow [1974], Baumol [1958], Cramer [1956], Herstein and Milnor [1953], 
Marschak [1950], and Samuelson [1966]. Savage [1954] provided a subjective probability 
interpretation of EUT. The following discussion follows Fishburn [1989]. 
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Assume P is a convex set of probability measures p, q, ... on a set X of decision 
outcomes. We can define >- to be a binary "is preferred to" preference relation on P, while 
a binary indifference relation, p ~ q, exists if neither p > q or q > p. The following axioms 
apply to the preference relation > ; 
1. The preference relation is weak order. 
That is, > is asymmetric, (p >- q) => not (q > p) 
and transitive, p>q, q>r=*p>r. 
2. The preference relation exhibits independence. 
If p > q , for each X such that 0 < X < 1 , rGP 
then, Xp + (1 - X)r >■ Xq + (1 - X)r 
3. The preference relation is continuous. 
If p >- q > r, 
then, ap + (1 - a)r > q > /3p + (1 - 0)r 
for some o: and /3 strictly between 0 and 1. 
Given >- on P, these axioms will hold if and only if there is a real valued function u 
on P such that for all p,q E P and all 0 < X < 1 ; 
P>q ** u(p)>u(q) 
and 
u(\p + (1 -\)q) - \u(p) + (l-\)u(q) 
These conditions on u imply that it is unique up to a positive linear transformation, 
and for every finite-support p E P , 
u(p) ~ I,P(x)u(x) 
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Empirical Testing of EUT 
There has been a considerable amount of empirical testing of the fundamental 
assumptions underlying EUT [see Fishburn [1988] for a review]. Generally, the work 
indicates that, although the axioms have great normative appeal, they are not very 
descriptive of actual behavior in choice situations. This section examines experiments 
investigating various axioms of EUT and the generalizations of EUT that have been 
proposed which retain a normative perspective. 
Transitivity. As a result of tests presented by Mosteller and Nogee [1951], May 
[1954], Tversky [1969], and MacCrimmon and Larrson [1979], among others, the assumption 
that individuals are always perfectly consistent in their choices has been brought into 
question as a descriptive principle of behavior. Intransitive preferences have been observed, 
particularly in choice situations that are complex and involve various multi-attribute 
comparisons of alternatives. 
Another case of intransitivity is preference reversal, where subjects systematically 
prefer gambles with high probability levels, but assign higher certainty equivalents to 
gambles with higher dollar amounts. This phenomena was first demonstrated by 
Lichtenstein and Slovic [1971, 1973] and Lindman [1971], and has been found in various 
experimental situations [Bostic, Herrnstein, and Luce, 1990; Grether and Plott, 1979; Kami 
and Safra, 1987; Pommerehne, Schneider, and Zweifil, 1982; Reiley, 1982; Slovic and 
Lichtenstein, 1983; Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman, 1990]. 
While transitivity is normatively compelling, violations of this assumption are not 
necessarily fatal; failure simply results in an unstable utility function, and complicates any 
theory of choice. The pervasiveness of intransitivities in choice, however, would seem to 
indicate that any descriptive model of choice not be based on the assumption of 
transitivity.7 Fishburn [1991] presents a review of nontransitive theories of choice, most 
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notably skew symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility [Fishburn, 1984, 1988] and the additive 
difference model first presented by Tversky [1969]. Other skew symmetric representations 
of preferences include regret theory [Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sudgen, 1982, 1987]. 
Independence. The independence axiom, which is also referred to as monotonicity, 
dominance, sure thing dominance, and substitution, has come under the most intense 
scrutiny of all the axioms. Although not part of the original derivation set forth by VNM, 
subsequent work, notably Malinvaud [1952] and Samuelson [1966], demonstrate how this 
assumption is implied by VNM in their development of EUT. The independence axiom 
implies that the utility function is linear in probability. 
The essence of this axiom holds that if one probability distribution (p) is preferred 
to another probability distribution (q), then any nontrivial convex combination of p with a 
third probability distribution (r) will be preferred to the same combination of q with r. The 
inclusion of a third probability distribution will not alter the basic preference of p over q. 
Another way of interpreting this is to say that the common consequence (r) does not play 
a part in the evaluation of compound lotteries. 
Allais [1953, 1979] was the first to question the adequacy of the independence axiom 
in describing individual preferences. The Allais Paradox, or common consequence effect as 
it is sometimes referred to, may be demonstrated with the following sets of gambles: 
Set one 
A: $1 million with 100% probability. 
B: $4 million with 90% probability, otherwise nothing. 
Set two 
C: $1 million with 5% probability, otherwise nothing. 
D: $4 million with 4.5% probability, otherwise nothing. 
When faced with these choices, individuals tend to prefer gamble A in the first set, 
and gamble D in the second set [see Allais, 1953, 1979; MacCrimmon and Larsson, 1979; 
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Hagen, 1979; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981 for examples]. 
Since gamble C (D) is a compound lottery made up of 5% of gamble A (B) and 95% of a 
third gamble which yields nothing with 100% probability, the preference of C over D should 
be observed in the second set, given a preference of A over B in the first set. The 
preference pattern of A > B and D > C violates the independence axiom. The choice of 
A over B reflects a preference for certainty, therefore, this pattern of preference is referred 
to as the "certainty effect". The certainty effect, however, is simply a special case of the 
"common ratio effect" in which pairs of gambles exhibiting the same ratio of probabilities 
(i.e. 1.0/0.90 and 0.05/0.045) should have the same preference ordering. 
Generalizations of EUT that have been proposed to accommodate violations of 
independence include the smooth preference theory of Machina [1982], lottery dependent, 
or rank dependent utility [Becker and Sarin, 1987], and cumulative utility [Quiggin, 1982; 
Yarri, 1987]. Variations of weighted utility theory [Chew and MacCrimmon, 1979; Chew, 
1982, 1983; Fishburn, 1983] also relax the assumption of independence, but unlike the 
previous theories, can be applied to non-monetary outcomes. Finally, SSB theory [Fishburn, 
1982] is non-linear in probabilities as well as being nontransitive. 
Continuity. The continuity axiom implies that, given a preference for outcome A 
over outcome C, a combination of A and C (e.g. B) should fall between the two outcomes. 
Preference orderings should be monotone; either A > B > C, or C > B > A. This is often 
referred to as the betweenness property, and has been investigated by Coombs [1975], 
Coombs and Meyer [1969], Coombs and Huang [1976], Chew and Waller [1986], Camerer 
[1989], MacDonald, Kagel, and Battalio [1989], and Evans, Phillips, and Holcomb [1991]. 
The results of this research have shown that although monotone orderings tend to be the 
most prevalent, there are significant numbers of preference orderings that are either folded 
(B > A > C, or B > C > A) or inverted (A > C > B, or C > A > B). Fishburn [1988] 
17 
discusses several theories that remove the continuity assumption, in particular, Hausner 
[1954], Chipman [1960], and Kannai [1963]. 
Overview. In summary, the empirical work performed to test EUT and its 
generalizations has found no single theory that can account for all the violations uncovered 
[Camerer, 1989; Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul, 1990]. In effect, EUT and its generalized 
versions do not provide an adequate descriptive theory of decision making under risk. Since 
this study’s focus is on descriptive, rather than normative, models of risky decision making, 
subsequent sections consider a descriptive approach to understanding individual decision 
making. The focus concerns Prospect Theory [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979], a major 
model that attempts to descriptively model risky choice. It is interesting to note that 
experimental work that derived individual utility functions [e.g. Barnes and Reinmuth, 1976; 
Davidson, Suppes, and Siegal, 1957; Green, 1963; Grayson, 1960; Halter and Dean, 1971; 
Mosteller and Nogee, 1951; Spetzler, 1968; Swalm, 1966] has yielded many functions that 
reveal similarities to the value function proposed by PT, providing support for its descriptive 
validity. In a recent review of generalized versions of EUT, Battalio, Kagel and Jiranyakul 
[1990] conclude that PT may provide the best effort thus far at a complete descriptive model 
of risky decision making. 
Prospect Theory 
Motivation 
Kahneman and Tversky [1979] proposed Prospect Theory (PT) as an alternative 
theory to accommodate various experimentally determined inconsistencies of EUT. They 
begin by presenting several classes of choice problems which demonstrate the inadequacies 
of EUT in providing a description of actual choice behavior. These include certainty effects, 
reflection effects, inconsistencies regarding probabilistic insurance, and isolation effects. 
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Certainty Effects. As previously noted, an early example of an individual’s failure 
to abide by EUT’s axioms was demonstrated by Allais [1953]. Allais’ work established that 
individual decision makers have a tendency to give greater weight to outcomes that are 
certain relative to outcomes that are simply likely. In reviewing the empirical testing of the 
independence axiom, it was demonstrated that when a pair of prospects are transformed in 
such a way that the certain alternative becomes probable, and the second alternative 
becomes less probable, preferences for the two outcomes will often reverse. This has come 
to be known as the Allais Paradox. Where previously subjects indicated a preference for 
the certain prospect, they now indicate a preference for the gamble with uncertain outcomes. 
The certainty effect is a failure of decision makers to abide by the independence axiom of 
EUT, and has been empirically demonstrated by Slovic and Tversky [1974] and 
MacCrimmon and Larsson [1979] among others. 
Reflection Effects. Another inconsistency Kahneman and Tversky point to is the 
notion that changing the signs of prospects (e.g., from positive to negative) often reverses 
outcome preferences. If subjects select a certain gain, rather than a chance for a higher 
gain, then the reflection effect would result in a preference for a risky loss gamble, rather 
than a sure loss. This reflection of prospects around zero has, in fact, been demonstrated 
by Markowitz [1952], Williams [1966], Budescu and Weiss [1985] and Fishburn and 
Kochenberger [1979]. 
In effect, subjects generally exhibit risk averting behavior when outcomes are in the 
positive domain, and risk seeking behavior in the negative domain. More specifically, a sure 
gain is generally preferred to a probable gain, but, in most cases, a probable loss is preferred 
to a certain loss. A joint consideration of certainty and reflection effects demonstrates that 
the preference for certainty is not universal, but is contingent upon the domain of the 
prospects. 
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Probabilistic Insurance. Probabilistic insurance is defined as an action taken to 
reduce, but not necessarily eliminate, the likelihood of some unfavorable event occurring. 
Thus, it is an action which lowers risk, but does not eliminate it. Examples of probabilistic 
insurance would be installing a burglar alarm, or wearing a seat belt. This incomplete 
reduction of risk is generally viewed as unattractive; subjects’ preferences seem to indicate 
that a reduction in probability from p to p/2 is less valuable than reducing the probability 
from p/2 to zero. People will pay a premium for the elimination of risk. 
Isolation Effects. To simplify decisions, people disregard components that are 
common to all the alternatives under consideration. In effect, they evaluate prospects in 
terms of their distinctive elements. Difficulties in understanding an individual’s preferences 
may arise when one considers the various ways in which alternatives may be decomposed. 
The isolation effect demonstrates that individuals fail to evaluate prospects solely by the 
probability of the final state, or by the final asset position. This implies that, rather than 
final wealth, it is changes in wealth that individuals look to in assessing value or utility. 
Work on the isolation effect has been conducted by Tversky [1972]. 
Basic Characteristics 
Editing Phase. In PT, the choice process is comprised of two stages. The first stage 
is an editing phase, in which prospects are organized and reformulated in ways that simplify 
evaluation and choice. While Kahneman and Tversky [1979] outlined the operations 
involved in editing, the development of the choice problems used to describe PT were 
formulated in such a way as to preclude the need for further editing. Thus, the editing 
phase of prospect evaluation is relatively unexplored. However, many of the anomalies of 
preference, such as isolation effects, may result from this process. Prospects may be edited 
in different ways under different circumstances. 
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The first editing operation considered by Kahneman and Tversky is the coding of 
outcomes as gains or losses relative to some neutral reference point. This point could be 
current asset position, or may be influenced by the formulation of the prospects, or the 
expectations of the decision makers. Decision makers are also assumed to combine 
probabilities associated with identical outcomes, and to segregate risky and riskless 
components. These operations are thought to be applied to each prospect separately. 
Kahneman and Tversky also suggested several editing operations which could be performed 
on a set of prospects. For example, the cancellation of common components is an operation 
in which outcomes that are shared by all prospects are eliminated. Other operations include 
the simplification of outcomes, where probabilities and/or outcomes are rounded off and 
extremely unlikely outcomes may be discarded entirely, and the elimination of dominated 
alternatives. 
Evaluation Phase. The second phase of the choice process is the evaluation of the 
edited prospects. The value of an edited prospect, V, is determined by the combination of 
a value function, v(-), and a decision weighting function, 7r (*). Given a regular prospect in 
which you may receive x with probability p, or y with probability q, and either p + q < 1, 
or x > 0 > y, or x < 0 < y, then the value of that prospect may be written; 
V(x,p;y,q) - tt(p)v(x) + tt(q)v(y) 
where v(0) = 0, 7r(0) = 0, and 7r(l) = 1. 
If the prospects to be evaluated involve situations in which the outcomes are all 
either strictly positive (x > y > 0), or strictly negative, (x < y < 0), and p + q = 1, then the 
value will be equal to the value of the riskless component plus the difference in value 
between the two outcomes, weighed by the decision weight associated with the larger 
outcome. Thus, 
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v(x,p;y,q) - v(y) + ^{p)[v(x)-v(y)] 
In examining the evaluation model proposed by Kahneman and Tversky, we see that, unlike 
EUT, PT does not require the expected value of the outcomes to always determine the value 
of the prospect. 
Value Function. The value function, v(*), [see figure 1, p. 6], is an important 
component of PT. It is defined over changes in wealth or welfare, rather than final wealth. 
The value function is hypothesized to be concave for gains, or outcomes above the reference 
point (v"(x) > 0 for x > 0), and convex for losses, those outcomes below the reference point 
(v"(x) < 0 for x < 0). Kahneman and Tversky refer to this shift in concavity as the 
reflection effect hypothesis. They also hypothesize that the value function exhibits loss 
aversion, that is, the response to a loss is more extreme than the response to an equivalent 
gain. This produces a function that is steeper in the domain of losses than in the domain 
of gains. Note that the empirical work on deriving von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
functions for individual decision makers has generally shown marked similarity to the value 
function proposed by Kahneman and Tversky [e.g. Barnes and Reinmuth, 1976; Grayson, 
1960; Halter and Dean, 1971; Mosteller and Nogee, 1951; Swalm, 1966]. 
Decision Weighting Function. The second component of the evaluation process 
concerns the decision weighting function. This function is more than the perceived 
likelihood of the event. It attempts to incorporate the overall impact of the event on the 
desirability of the prospects in a more subjective manner. The hypothesized properties of 
this function are such that large and intermediate probabilities are underweighted (7r(p) < 
p for high p), while small probabilities are overweighed (7r(p) > p for small p) [see figure 
2, p. 7], The decision weighting function is discontinuous at its endpoints. Very small 
probabilities may be totally disregarded, or else given extreme overweighing, while very high 
probabilities tend to be treated as certain. The decision function also exhibits what is known 
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as sub-certainty; the summation of the decision weights do not add up to one as they would 
if they were probabilities [for all 0 < p < 1, ?r(p) + 7r(l-p) < 1]. Sub-certainty produces 
increased preferences for riskless outcomes when the value function is in the area of gains, 
and increased preferences for risky outcomes in the area of losses. Together, the value 
function and the decision weighting function provide an expected utility like representation 
of an individual’s perception of risky choice scenarios. 
Overview 
Explicitly considering gains, losses, and aspiration levels potentially brings increased 
realism to the mathematical representations of risky decision making. Models such as PT 
have provided many testable hypotheses with respect to risk taking behavior, and the 
research has contributed additional insights into the perception of risk. Although there is 
uncertainty regarding the position of the reference point, and what goes on with respect to 
risk behavior on either side of it, the idea that subjects consider alternatives with respect 
to some reference point when evaluating risky outcomes remains a plausible hypothesis. 
This reference point may be the status quo (total current wealth or assets, or current 
performance), or some target level of wealth or assets to which one is aspiring to. It may 
be positive, or negative, or zero. Most likely, the reference point changes from situation to 
situation and is, in a large part, contextually determined. Variations in the reference point 
can determine if an outcome is viewed as a gain or a loss, so in this respect different 
reference points define the frame of the choice situation, and thus produce differences in 
risk behavior and value functions. 
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Empirical Testing of Prospect Theory 
Basic Tests 
To support their development of PT, Kahneman and Tversky [1979] present a series 
of tests designed to demonstrate violations of various axioms of EUT and support for the 
basic propositions of PT. For example, the certainty effect described by Allais [1953] was 
investigated using modest amounts to gain as well as non-monetary outcomes. Results 
indicating violations of the independence axiom were consistent with those reported by 
Allais [1979] and MacCrimmon and Larsson [1979]. Another series of experiments 
performed by Kahneman and Tversky [1979] demonstrated the isolation effect, and were 
supported by Camerer [1989], Thaler and Johnson [1990], Tversky and Kahneman [1981, 
1986] and Kahneman and Tversky [1984]. 
To investigate a basic proposition of PT, the reflection effect, Kahneman and 
Tversky [1979] examined the risk behavior of subjects for gambles involving gains and losses. 
In a series of decision problems, one group of subjects responded to alternatives that offered 
an opportunity to gain money, while a second group considered outcomes concerned with 
losses. Amounts and probabilities were the same in both groups. For example, in one set 
of problems, subjects were presented with the following choices; 
Group 1: (N = 95) Choose between, 
A: 4,000 with probability .80 B: 3,000 
Group 2: (N = 95) Choose between, 
A: -4,000 with probability .80 B: -3,000 
Results clearly indicated a reversal of preference between the positive and negative 
gambles. When presented with gambles involving positive amounts, a majority of subjects 
(80%) preferred the sure gain. However, when gambles were presented in terms of losses, 
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subjects preferred the probabilistic loss over the certain loss (92% vs. 8%). When both 
alternatives involved probabilistic outcomes, there was a similar reflection effect, although 
not as strong. Overall, subjects exhibited risk avoidance in the domain of gains and risk 
seeking in the domain of losses. Kahneman and Tversky [1979] conclude that the presence 
of guaranteed outcomes result in more extreme reactions. In the case of gains, certainty 
makes an option more attractive, while it is viewed as less appealing when dealing with 
losses. Other empirical work supporting the finding of risk seeking in the domain of losses 
and risk averting in the domain of gains has been performed by Fischhoff [1983], Fishburn 
and Kochenberger [1979], Hershey and Schoemaker [1980b], Laughhunn, Payne and Crum 
[1980], MacCrimmon and Wehrung [1986], Payne, Laughhunn and Crum [1980], Slovic, 
Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein [1984], and Tversky and Kahneman [1981]. 
Payne, Laughhunn and Crum [1980] and Laughhunn, Payne and Crum [1980] 
investigated the need to incorporate aspiration levels into models of risky decision making. 
They tested both the (a - t) model proposed by Fishburn [1977], and PT developed by 
Kahneman and Tversky [1979]. Payne, Laughhunn and Crum [1980] hypothesized that 
choices between pairs of gambles will reverse when the gambles are transformed such that 
they cross an aspiration level. The translation of gambles involved adding or subtracting a 
constant (k) from all outcomes of a three-outcome gamble. The initial gambles had the 
same expected value, but different dispersions, and shared a common target assumed to be 
zero.8 As a result of the translations, one of the gambles had all of its outcomes either 
above (if k > 0) or below (if k < 0) the target value, while the other continued to have at 
least one outcome on the other side of the target. 
The results of Payne et. al. demonstrated that "positive and negative translations of 
the set of gambles [lead] to reversals in choice" (p. 1046). The patterns of choice revealed 
that, generally, when a positive amount was added to the gambles, subjects were inclined to 
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select the less risky gamble. When the same amount was subtracted from the gambles, there 
was a tendency for increased risk seeking behavior, although the effect was less pronounced. 
Additional results showed that subjects had stronger preferences "for gamble pairs in which 
one gamble had all outcomes exceeding the target and the other gamble had an outcome 
below the target" (p. 1049). Perhaps, in these choice situations, subjects found it easier to 
select the gamble they preferred. Overall, these results are inconsistent with assumptions 
regarding uniformly concave utility functions (risk averse behavior in all contexts), and 
support the specification of the value function proposed by Kahneman and Tversky’s 
Prospect Theory. Payne and his colleagues conclude that it is important to account for a 
decision maker’s level of aspiration if a model of risky choice is to have predictive ability. 
In a closer examination of behavior in the loss domain, Laughhunn, Payne and Crum 
[1980] presented business managers with a simple choice between a two-outcome loss 
gamble, such as losing $20 with the probability .5 or otherwise losing nothing, and a sure loss 
of $10. Depending upon the gamble selected as preferred, the probability level or the sure 
loss amount was then manipulated until the subject was indifferent between the two gambles. 
The experimental conditions involved (1) different decision contexts (i.e., personal or 
business), and (2) different scales for the gambles (i.e., 1, 100, or 100,000). Results 
indicated that a significant majority of the subjects exhibited risk seeking behavior in the 
presence of below target returns, however, there was greater risk taking in the personal 
rather than business contexts.9 Also, changes in the scale for losses had no significant effect 
on risk behavior. 
Framing Studies 
The notion of a differential impact on choice as a result of outcomes presented as 
gains or as losses is the essence of "framing". Tests by Kahneman and Tversky [1979, 1984] 
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and Tversky and Kahneman [1981, 1986] indicate that the framing of outcomes has a 
significant effect on subjects’ preferences for risky or certain alternatives. Consider the 
following problems in which equivalent alternatives are described in terms of the number 
of lives that would be saved versus the number that would be lost if a program is selected. 
N indicates the total number of respondents, while the numbers in parentheses indicate the 
percentage of subjects who chose each option. 
Problem 1 (N = 152): Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an 
unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative 
programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact 
scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. (72%) 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will 
be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. (28%) 
Which of the two programs do you favor? 
Problem 2 (N = 155): [Same initial representation used in problem 1.] 
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. (22%) 
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die 
and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die. (78%) 
Which of the two programs do you favor? 
The frames are equivalent (i.e. if 200 out of 600 people are saved, then 400 will 
necessarily die), however, results demonstrate a clear difference in preference between the 
two frames. Preference for prospects is affected by the manner in which the prospects are 
described. Apparently, lives saved induces a gain frame resulting in risk avoidance, while 
lives lost induces a loss frame and risk taking. This violates the assumption of asymmetry; 
that is, if p is preferred to q, then q will not be preferred to p. This is also referred to as 
the principle of invariance. When confronted with their failure to abide by this principle, 
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subjects persist in their desire to be risk averse in the lives saved version, and risk seeking 
in the lives lost version. 
McNeil, Pauker, Sox, and Tversky [1982] provided an interesting demonstration of 
the influence of problem formulation on the preferences of both physicians and patients for 
hypothetical therapies for lung cancer. When presented in terms of mortality rates, surgical 
treatment, which entails the possibility of death during treatment, was seen as less favorable 
than radiation therapy. However, when the choice was presented in terms of survival rates, 
surgery was viewed as more favorable since it had a higher overall survival rate than 
radiation treatment. Interestingly, the differences in preference between the survival and 
mortality frame was just as strong for physicians as it was for patients. 
Note that while framing appears to be an important aspect of risky decision making, 
problems are evident when attempting to predict risky choice. Fischhoff [1983] found that 
it was extremely difficult to predict the frame employed by subjects in various choice 
situations. It appears that there is a great deal of individual variation in the selection of 
decision frames. Individual choice was generally unrelated to the frame subjects reported 
as most natural, and throughout the series of seven experiments, Fischhoff had great 
difficulty in manipulating individual frame preferences. Thus, while the importance of 
frames to decision making seems clear, our understanding of how frames are determined 
is far from complete. 
Studies Questioning Prospect Theory 
While considerable data support PT as a descriptive model of decision making, 
results of some studies question the generalizability of the findings. For example, Hershey 
and Schoemaker [1980a] question whether the relation between risk seeking for losses and 
risk averting for gains that has been found across subjects occurs within subjects. They also 
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note that reflectivity in choice is most often found when extreme amounts or extreme 
probabilities are present. Schneider and Lopes [1986] found that the reflection hypothesis 
had only weak support, except when choices involve a riskless outcome. They state that 
choices among risks reflect one’s immediate aspiration level, and that risk seeking subjects 
set aspiration levels higher than those set by risk avoiding subjects. Consequently, it is 
unclear exactly what the aspiration level is, and how it may change. Cohen, Jaffray and Said 
[1987] present within-subject results revealing that 41% of their subjects made choices that 
are consistent with the reflection hypothesis. The authors suggest that an individual’s 
attitude towards risk is independent of gains or losses. In addition, Fagley and Miller [1987] 
question the robustness of framing effects. While the data presented by these authors show 
a significant interaction between the decision frame and choice, the risk averse choice was 
most preferred in both the positive and negative frame. Thus, there was not a pure mirror¬ 
like reflection between the positive and negative frames reported by Tversky and Kahneman 
[1981]. The authors note that additional work must be performed to determine what factors 
may impact framing effects. 
Investigations Concerning Additional Factors 
Ruinous Losses 
Laughhunn, Payne, and Crum [1980] present initial data on the effect of ruinous 
losses on risky behavior. They provided two experimental groups with a choice context 
involving losses. One group was told that the potential loss would cause "severe liquidity 
problems for their firms, and possibly bankruptcy" (p. 1242). The results indicated that most 
subjects (77%) were risk seeking in the presence of below target returns. However, in the 
ruinous loss condition, a majority of the subjects (64%) displayed risk aversion. Ruinous 
loss possibilities seem to change risk preferences in the domain of losses from generally risk 
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seeking to risk averting. This suggests that the strict reflection point hypothesized by PT’s 
value function may be contextually affected. 
In a series of scenarios designed to investigate the prevalence of risk taking in the 
domain of losses, Hershey and Schoemaker [1980b] present results which indicate that 
individuals are both risk seeking and risk averting when losses are involved. When the 
magnitude of the potential loss becomes sufficiently large (in this particular instance, the 
loss amount was $1 million), behavior changed from risk seeking to risk averting. This 
effect was significantly stronger when the choices were placed in an insurance context than 
when placed in a gamble framework. Once again, it appears that the value function may 
have a second inflection point, and, while the specific point at which the inflection occurs 
is uncertain, it appears to be contextually determined. 
Prior Gains and Losses 
Another contextual factor that may influence risk taking behavior is the existence of 
prior gains or losses. Empirical work indicates that decision makers may be affected by 
prior outcomes [Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Staw, 1981; Thaler, 1980; Thaler and Johnson, 
1990]. The effect of prior outcomes can be handled by PT in the editing phase. As 
Kahneman and Tversky state, "...people generally evaluate acts in terms of a minimal 
account which includes only the direct consequences of an act" [Kahneman and Tversky, 
1981, p. 457]. That is, only the gain or loss of the present gamble is considered, and not 
outcomes of previous gambles. However, they also recognize that "there are situations...in 
which the outcomes of an act can affect the balance in an account that was previously set 
up by a related act. In these cases the decision at hand may be evaluated in terms of a 
more inclusive account" [Kahneman and Tversky, 1981, p.457]. They suggest, as an 
example, that the occurrence of prior losses can affect risky behavior. 
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Thaler and Johnson [1990] suggest that prior gains, too, may impact current decision 
making through what they refer to as a ’house money effect’. They investigated the impact 
of prior outcomes on subsequent choice by comparing subjects’ preferences for various 
gambles. For approximately one-half of the subjects, the alternatives were presented as one 
stage gambles. For example, this group was asked to choose between a sure gain of $15 and 
a 50% chance of gaining $19.50 and a 50% chance to gain $10.50, and also between a sure 
loss of $7.50 and a 50% chance to lose $5.25 and a 50% chance to lose $9.75. The second 
experimental group received gambles that, in terms of final wealth, left them in the exact 
same net position as those in the one stage gamble group. However, the gambles were 
presented in a two stage format. For example, these subjects were asked to evaluate such 
situations as; you have just won $15, now you must choose between doing nothing, and a 
50% chance of gaining $4.50 and a 50% chance of losing $4.50. The two stage version 
incorporating prior losses had the subject choose between no further gain or loss, and a 50- 
50 chance at gaining $2.50 or losing $2.50, after being informed of a $7.50 prior loss. 
If outcomes of the two stage gambles are simply combined, there should be no 
difference in risk behavior between the one stage and two stage format. However, the data 
revealed an increase in risk seeking behavior when prior gains were present. In the one 
stage gamble described above, 44% selected the risky option, while 77% of the subjects 
selected the risky option in the two stage prior gain version. Presentation format had a 
significant effect on choice. 
In the case of prior losses, the interpretation of risk behavior was not as 
straightforward. In these situations, the key to risk behavior seemed to be the presence or 
absence of an opportunity to breakeven. When the risky gamble did not provide enough of 
a gain to cover the prior losses (e.g., a gain of $2.50 does not cover the prior loss of $7.50), 
the majority of subjects (60%) selected the sure outcome indicating risk avoidance. This 
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is compared with the one stage version, where only 23% of the subjects chose the risk 
avoiding alternative. However, there was a marked preference for the risky alternative when 
it presented the possibility to breakeven (i.e., recoup the prior loss). These results indicate 
that recently experienced gains and losses represent another contextual variable that may 
impact risky choice. 
Multiple Potential Reference Points 
Previous research indicates that risky choice behavior is influenced by reference 
points. However, it is unclear how choice may be affected by the presence of more than one 
potential reference point, a common occurrence in complex business contexts. Research 
dealing with this particular aspect of decision making is scarce. 
While Payne, Laughhunn, and Crum [1981] did not explicitly test the effect of 
multiple reference points, they provide data relevant to the issue. Subjects were given an 
explicit reference point; the level of profit used to evaluate performance on a series of 
decisions. The reference point was manipulated over three levels (0, $160,000, and 
$320,000), and subjects were asked to evaluate 15 pairs of gambles. Depending upon the 
group’s explicit target, the outcomes for the gambles could be considered gains or losses. 
For example, a gamble that offered a 50% chance to gain $10,000 may be considered a gain 
to the first group (those with a profit level of zero), but a loss to subjects in the other two 
groups since it fails to achieve their target. Results indicated that giving managers explicit 
targets produced changes in their risk behavior, however, the change was not as great as was 
evidenced with a fixed target of zero. In one instance, it was found that managers did not 
treat the smaller, but positive, outcome as a loss, although it failed to reach their explicitly 
stated target. The authors concluded that targets are important in determining risk 
behavior, and are likely to be a fundamental cause of inflections in value functions. Their 
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data also suggest that decision makers may consider the effects of more than one potential 
reference point. 
Puto [1987] conducted a study in an industrial buying scenario that attempted to 
capture reference point effects in complex decision contexts. A number of possible 
reference points were considered, such as the amount currently paid, the announced future 
price, the firm offer made by the riskless supplier, and the budgeted cost of a product. 
However, subjects were asked to indicate the initial and final reference point utilized. 
Therefore, while the study provides insights into the possible basis of reference point 
formation, it does not provide data on the possibility of a joint consideration of multiple 
reference points that is the concern in the present study. To investigate this issue, the 
reference points must be presented as neutrally as possible, and the influence of one or both 
of the points must be inferred from less direct measures. 
Multidimensional Aspects of Risk 
The work reviewed above concerns risky behavior that occurs in various decision 
contexts. Individuals are seen as risk avoiding and risk taking in gain and loss situations, 
respectively. These observations pertain to general tendencies in a subject group. However, 
individual differences occur; not all subjects are risk taking in loss scenarios. An individual’s 
perception of risk may affect their risky behavior. This study therefore investigates whether 
differences in individuals’ risk perceptions explain variance in risk behavior. Based upon 
prior research, a multidimensional view of risk is utilized to measure risk perceptions. This 
section concerns the multiple dimensions of the risk construct. 
In studies of hazardous activities [e.g. Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, 1983,1984], 
researchers have typically been concerned with determining how individuals evaluate 
hazardous activities, what people mean when they use the term "risky", and what factors 
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comprise those risk perceptions. The result is a cognitive mapping of risk attitudes and 
perceptions. Generally, these studies employ factor analytic techniques, are primarily 
descriptive in nature, and are concerned with predicting society’s response to various 
technological hazards.10 With these techniques, researchers are able to identify ways in 
which groups hold similar or diverse views regarding the risk of different activities. They 
also uncover the multidimensionality of the risk construct. 
These studies typically conclude that risk characteristics may be reduced to two 
primary factors. The first is Dread Risk, a dimension that isolates risks according to a 
catastrophic potential, the severity of the consequences, the controllability of the 
consequences and the risk to future generations. The second factor obtained is typically 
labeled Unknown Risk, and discriminates between hazards that are familiar, that have been 
around longer, and that have immediate effects, from those that are new, unfamiliar, and 
have delayed effects. The research also suggests that different methods of analysis produce 
different representations of risk [Johnson and Tversky, 1984]. Therefore, Slovic, Fischhoff 
and Lichtenstein [1983] conclude that "there is no one way to model risk perception, no 
universal cognitive map. People maintain multiple perspectives on the world of hazards" (p. 
12). 
Factors such as the amount to gain and the amount to lose, along with the 
probability of gain and the probability of loss, have been identified by Slovic and 
Lichtenstein [1968] as important dimensions of risk. Slovic and Lichtenstein hypothesized 
that these dimensions can be used to characterize the risk a decision maker perceives, and 
that decision makers combine these dimensions to reach a decision regarding the 
attractiveness of a gamble. Slovic [1964] defined risk as a functional relationship between 
the severity of the outcome and the probability of occurrence. He found that perceived risk 
was more likely to be determined by the probability of loss and the amount to be lost rather 
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than by the variance of outcomes. The importance of the loss amount and probability was 
also found to be significant by Keller, Sarin, and Weber [1986]. In addition, March and 
Shapira [1987] reported that most managers recognized the probabilistic aspects of risk, but 
felt that the size of negative consequences was a more important determinant of riskiness. 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung [1986] found that when gambles involved large amounts of 
money, there was a tendency for individuals to take fewer risks. 
Controllability contributes to the level of dread risk inherent in a risky situation and 
may be another important aspect of risk. To the extent an individual can, either through 
personal skill or effort, avoid the negative consequences of a risk, that risk will be perceived 
as controllable. Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein [1984] presented results which suggest 
that subjects differentiate between risks that are controllable and those they feel they have 
little control over. Rotter [1966] examined risk behavior with respect to the locus of 
control.11 If an individual believes that the controlling force in a situation is external, 
rather than internal, the individual may be more likely to behave in a risk avoiding manner. 
In a similar vein, an investigation by McClelland [1961] found that entrepreneurs were more 
likely to take risks in situations where their skill or effort made a difference in the final 
outcomes. When examining the illusion of control, Langer [1977] found that when 
individuals engage in actions that make them feel in control of the situation, they become 
more confident and believe they have a greater probability of success than objective 
probabilities would warrant. Finally, March and Shapira [1987] discuss results of studies 
which indicate that managers tend to view risk as controllable, and see their activities as 
controlled risk taking rather than gambling. 
The studies reviewed above present results suggesting a multidimensional concept 
of risk. In effect, risk is a complex construct that may encompass a number of distinct 
characteristics. Therefore, various dimensions should be measured when attempting to 
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capture individuals’ risk perceptions. The present study measures relevant risk dimensions 
in an attempt to better explain individuals’ risk behavior. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
The purpose of this study is to test a number of propositions concerning individual 
decision making within financial contexts. These include tests of certain aspects of Prospect 
Theory, as well as potential extensions of the theory that are particularly relevant to 
financial decision makers. Specifically, the study examines the relevance of Prospect Theory 
in a number of contexts encountered by financial managers in their professional decision 
making capacity. 
Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis follows directly from PT. It examines whether decision makers 
use reference points in their decision processes and exhibit differences in risk taking 
behavior on either side of the reference point. Specifically, the following hypothesis is 
tested: 
Hji Financial decision makers base their decisions on changes in 
wealth from a reference point, with outcomes above the reference 
point resulting in risk avoidance, and outcomes below producing risk 
seeking. 
Generally, applications of EUT in finance assume that individuals typically exhibit 
risk aversion. If PT holds, individuals will exhibit risk seeking behavior below a reference 
point, and risk averting behavior above. Support for hypothesis one would therefore 
necessitate questioning the assumption of overall risk aversion as a choice criteria for 
individual decision makers. To test this hypothesis, a number of experiments were 
conducted which investigated risk taking behavior of financial managers across a variety of 
decision making contexts often faced by those managers. 
The following hypotheses involve additional factors that may affect financial risk 
taking behavior. Their investigation may therefore extend our understanding of financial 
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decision making under risk, as well as our theory of risky behavior in general. The second 
hypothesis concerns the impact of prior outcomes on risk taking behavior. Financial 
decision makers continually make judgments that result in financial gains and losses. While 
these prior outcomes should not affect current decisions, results presented by Thaler and 
Johnson [1990] suggest that prior gains and losses do impact risky choice behavior. Based 
upon these preliminary data, the following hypothesis is examined: 
H2: Prior gains and losses will impact risk taking behavior. 
Prior gains will increase subjects’ willingness to accept risk, 
while prior losses will decrease their willingness to take risks. 
However, risky alternatives that potentially negate a prior 
loss will result in risk taking. 
The threat of bankruptcy introduces a critical factor in many financial decision 
contexts. Laughhunn, Payne, and Crum [1980] present initial data suggesting that the 
presence of ruinous loss conditions may produce a change in the general risk seeking 
behavior for choices below a reference point as predicted by PT. In effect, choices involving 
losses that could be ruinous may cause a switch to risk aversion. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is tested: 
H3: When a risky alternative exposes a decision maker to the 
threat of bankruptcy, risk behavior in loss situations will 
change from risk seeking to risk averting. 
In many financial contexts managers are faced with the possibility of multiple 
reference points. One particularly important context concerns the evaluation of investment 
alternatives when a current performance level is known, reflecting the status quo, and the 
company has set a target performance level for the manager. Managers often operate in 
such situations, yet the effect of target and current performance levels on their decision 
making is open to question. Do managers initially select one of the two points for 
reference? That is, do they typically key on target data and adjust choices accordingly, or 
is the current performance level more important when making such choice decisions? 
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Alternatively, are both reference points jointly considered in some manner? Since both 
levels of performance can be crucial when managers’ performance is evaluated (e.g. while 
a performance level that does not meet the target may be looked on unfavorably, it may still 
be above recent performance, which may be considered favorable), the following is 
hypothesized: 
H4: In general, managers’ risky behavior will be affected by both 
current and target performance. 
Finally, this study considers the impact of an individual’s perception of risk on his 
or her risky choice behavior. This question is of an exploratory nature, and no specific 
hypothesis is proposed. Rather, the aim of the analysis is to obtain a better understanding 
of the cognitive factors that may account for risk seeking or averting behavior in financial 
contexts. 
Seven experiments were performed to test the four hypotheses. Data from several 
of the experiments provide a test of Table 3.1 summarizes the results from the various 
experiments that would provide support for the hypothesized effects. 
Methodology 
Subjects 
A total of seventy-two subjects participated in the final experiments. Table 3.2 
provides a description of the relevant characteristics of the subject group. The subjects were 
experienced corporate financial managers with an average of 21.6 years of total corporate 
work experience. On average, they had been in their current position for about 6 years. 
The managers held positions of significant decision making responsibility within their firms. 
As listed in table 3.2, their positions were typically CFO, Treasurer, or Vice President of 
Finance. The managers worked for small to medium sized companies in the New England 
area whose average size was $82.6 million in sales. 
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Table 3.1 
Hypothesized Results 
Hypotheses Experiments Evidence In Support of Hypotheses 
Gain Condition Loss Condition 
Hi 
1 A > B B > A 
One Stage Gambles 
Gain Loss 
2 Set #i Set #3 
B > A A > B 
Set #2 Set #4 
B > A A > B 
Non-Bankmptcy Condition 
3 A > B 
Profit/Revenue Condition 
4 A > B 
5 B > A 
6 A > B 
All Outcomes Above Target All Outcomes Below Target 
7 
#1) A > B #3) B > A 
#5) A > B #7) B > A 
One Stage Gambles Two Stage Gambles 
Gain Loss Gain Loss 
Ho 2 Set #7 Set #3 Set #1 Set #3 A12 B > A A > B A > B A > B 
Set #2 Set #4 Set #2 Set #4 
B > A A > B A > B B > A 
Continued, next page. 
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Table 3.1 (Coni.) 
Hypotheses Experiments Evidence in Support of Hypotheses 
h3 3 
Non-Bankruptcy Condition Bankruptcy Condition 
A > B B > A 
h4 7 
Outcomes 
all above 
target 
Outcomes between 
target and 
current performance 
Outcomes 
all below 
current 
#1) A > B 
#5) A > B 
For #2) #4) #6) and #8) 
selection of either A or B 
#3) B > A 
#7) B > A 
Refer to Appendix for the specific risky behavior indicated by alternatives A and B in each 
experimental scenario. 
Table 3.2 
Demographic Data 
Position within Firm 
Title Number of Subjects 
Chief Financial Officer 18 
Treasurer 20 
Vice President, Finance 16 
President 4 
Executive Vice President 5 
Controller 4 
Other 5 
Mean Standard Deviation 
Total Number of 
Years of 21.61 9.03 
Work Experience 
Number of Years 
at Current 6.06 4.77 
Position 
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The subjects group was obtained in the following manner. A listing of potential 
subjects was first generated from Dun and Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory. 
Manufacturing companies12 with annual sales of $1 to $200 million were randomly selected 
from six New England states, and the name of the most senior executive responsible for 
financial matters for the company was noted. To assure an adequate response rate, I 
personally contacted each of the executives by phone to explain the study in general terms 
and solicit their cooperation. Of the 119 executives contacted, 96 agreed to participate. A 
version of the instrument was mailed to these 96 managers, along with a cover letter, a 
stamped envelope, and a return postcard indicating that they would like to receive a copy 
of the final results. Completed instruments were received from 72 subjects, yielding a 
response rate of 75%. 
Experimental Task 
Seven different experiments were conducted. Each subject was asked to respond to 
the seven relevant decision contexts, some of which required multiple judgments. For each 
decision, two possible investment alternatives were presented. One alternative reflected a 
risky option, while the other selection was certain or less risky. The subjects were asked to 
choose one of the two alternatives and to rate their strength of preference for that 
alternative. Strength of preference was obtained using a five point scale with endpoints 
labeled, "strongly prefer the chosen alternative" and "weakly prefer the chosen alternative". 
After the subjects completed the decision scenarios, they responded to twelve statements 
on a five point agree/disagree scale that concerned issues relating to risk taking behavior. 
The general instructions for each booklet specifically directed the subjects to 
consider each choice scenario independently and sequentially. It was emphasized that there 
were no correct or incorrect responses, rather, that they should use their professional 
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judgment. The subjects were instructed to put themselves in the position of a corporate 
executive responsible for making the decision under consideration. 
To ensure the appropriateness of the scenarios and the scale items, the instrument 
was pretested on a total of twenty subjects. A preliminary pretest was run on seven business 
students to determine the most appropriate wording of the preference scale.13 A second 
pretest was then conducted on the entire research instrument which incorporated the results 
of the preliminary scale pretest. Thirteen business students, faculty and corporate executives 
participated in this phase of pretesting. The results indicated that the scenarios were, in 
« 
fact, perceived by the subjects in the way intended, and that the instructions were clear and 
unambiguous. 
Four versions of the final instrument were developed. Each subject was mailed one 
randomly chosen version. In each version, the subject responded to both gain and loss 
decision scenarios, with approximately one-half of the decisions involving gains, and one-half 
involving losses. Four versions were necessary because experiment two utilized four between 
subjects groups. Experiments one, three, four, five and six alternated experimental 
conditions over the four versions. Thus, two versions presented the gain, non-bankruptcy, 
profit, cost, and expenditure conditions for these experiments, respectively, while the other 
two versions presented the loss, bankruptcy, cost, profit, and revenue conditions for each of 
the respective experiments. In addition, experiment seven required that the subjects 
respond to eight scenarios. Four different versions were created by randomizing the order 
of the eight scenarios. The specific manipulations of each experiment follow. 
Experiment 1: Basic Test of Prospect Theory: Framing 
The first experiment tests a fundamental issue of Prospect Theory (i.e. risk taking 
(avoiding) behavior below (above) a reference point), as well as provides evidence on the 
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effect of decision frames in financial decision making. In a typical framing experiment, the 
alternatives are constructed so that both the gain and loss scenarios yield identical results. 
However, the wording of the alternatives are expected to induce distinctly different decision 
frames, resulting in different decisions. 
Design. Experiment one is based on the classic "lives saved, lives lost" scenario of 
Tversky and Kahneman [1981, 1986]. It is constructed to allow a comparison with 
Kahneman and Tversky’s often cited framing illustration and employs a between subjects 
design. The actual scenarios presented to the subjects are reproduced in exhibit 1 of the 
appendix. The subjects were told that their division is expecting a loss of $600,000, and that 
they must chose one of two investment alternatives. For one group of subjects, the 
alternatives are presented as gains. Option A offers the decision maker the opportunity for 
a sure savings of $200,000, while option B presents a 1/3 chance to save the entire $600,000 
and a 2/3 chance to save nothing. In the loss condition, the options are complementary to 
the gain condition, with option A offering a sure loss of $400,000, and option B offering a 
1/3 chance of losing nothing, and a 2/3 chance of losing everything. Of course, alternative 
A in both conditions is identical in terms of its final outcome, as is alternative B. According 
to EUT, artificially framing the alternatives in terms of gains or losses should have no effect 
on judgments. However, PT predicts that the majority of subjects will choose the sure 
outcome in the gain condition, exhibiting risk averting behavior, and the probabilistic 
alternative in the loss condition, exhibiting risk taking behavior. 
Subjects were also asked to indicate the strength of their preference for that 
alternative. A five point scale was provided, with end points labeled, "weakly prefer the 
chosen alternative" and "strongly prefer the chosen alternative". Subjects were instructed 
to place an X in the space that best indicates the degree to which they prefer the chosen 
alternative. An X placed closer to the left end of the scale indicated a weaker preference 
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for the chosen alternative, while an X placed closer to the right end of the scale indicated 
a stronger preference. 
In addition to analyzing subjects’ choices and their strength of preference, the five 
point preference measure was combined with the alternative selected to create a ten point 
scale, a transformed preference rating measure. The scale was reversed scored for risk 
averting choices. Thus, the endpoints on this scale are Ml" for those subjects who chose the 
certain alternative (A) and indicated that they strongly preferred this choice by checking 5 
on the strength of preference scale, and "10" for those subjects selecting the risky alternative 
(B) and indicating a strong preference for their choice. This transformed preference 
measure provides a finer assessment of subjects’ choices by transforming the dichotomous 
alternative selection into a variable which indicates how strong their tendency was to accept 
or reject risk. 
Results and Discussion. The results of experiment one are presented in tables 3.3 
and 3.4. Table 3.3 presents the total number of subjects selecting the certain or risky 
outcome in each of the experimental conditions. The values in parentheses express the 
percentage of the total for each condition. The overall chi-square of 10.34 provides 
evidence that subjects’ choices of risky or certain alternatives did in fact depend upon the 
experimental condition (p = .001). A closer examination of the choices made in the gain and 
loss conditions clarify this result. Subjects were much more likely (75% vs. 25%) to select 
the risky alternative when the choice was framed in terms of losses (x2 = 9.0, p = .003). Thus, 
we see risk taking in the presence of losses as predicted by PT and hypothesized in H,. In 
the gain condition a greater number of subjects chose the certain outcome (62.9% vs 
37.1%), indicating a tendency for risk aversion in the presence of gains as hypothesized. 
However, the results failed to reach statistical significance (x2 = 2.314, p = .128). An 
examination of just those subjects selecting the certain (risky) alternative provides an 
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Table 3.3 
Experiment One: 
Total Number of Subjects (Percentage) 
Selecting Certain vs. Risky Alternative 
Gain Loss Row 
Condition Condition Total 
Certain 22 9 31 
Outcome 
(62.9%) (25.0%) (43.7%) 
Risky 13 27 40 
Outcome 
(37.1%) (75.0%) (56.3%) 
Column 35 36 71 
Total 
(49.3%) (50.7%) (100.0%) 
alternative analysis of the data and lends support for hypothesis one. Those subjects who 
selected the certain outcome were more likely to have been in the gain condition (x2=5.452, 
p = .020), while subjects selecting the risky outcome were more likely to have been in the loss 
condition (x2=4.90, p = .027). 
These results are generally in line with those presented by Kahneman and Tversky 
[1981, 1986]. They indicated that 78% of their subjects selected the risky alternative in the 
loss frame. This compares with 75% in the current experiment. For the gain frame, 72% 
of their subjects selected the certain outcome, slightly higher than the 62.9% reported in the 
present experiment. 
A comparison of the transformed preference ratings provides further support for the 
first hypothesis. This measure may be more discriminating in terms of an individual’s risky 
choice since it combines the alternative selected with the subject’s strength of preference for 
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that alternative. The mean transformed preference rating is 4.49 (S.D. = 3.19) in the gain 
condition and 6.86 (S.D. = 2.63) in the loss condition. These are significantly different at 
p = .001 (t = 3.42), indicating that subjects in the gain condition more strongly preferred the 
certain alternative, while subjects in the loss condition more strongly preferred the risky 
alternative. 
Table 3.4 presents the mean preference ratings for each cell. While strength of 
preferences were slightly higher in the gain condition than the loss condition (3.60 vs. 3.22), 
and higher when subjects chose the certain versus risky outcome (3.61 vs. 3.25), these 
differences are not statistically significant (t = 1.40, p = .165, t = 1.34, p = .186, respectively). 
In summary, these results indicate framing effects that are generally in line with PT. 
Artificially changing the frame of the decision problem resulted in a change in the financial 
managers’ decisions even though the alternatives they were faced with were essentially 
identical in both groups. Risk taking behavior occurred when the alternative was presented 
as a potential loss, and a tendency towards risk avoidance was observed when the alternative 
was framed as a possible gain. 
Experiment 2: Prior Gains and Losses 
The influence of prior gains and losses on risky choice behavior is assessed in 
experiment two. Since financial managers continuously make investment decisions, gains 
or losses from prior decisions have often occurred. Decision making is not performed in 
a vacuum, and decision makers are cognizant of the results of previous decisions. 
Normatively, these prior outcomes should have no bearing on current decisions. Decision 
makers are exhorted to utilize only the incremental consequences of the alternatives under 
consideration when making their choices. However, prior gains or losses may, in fact, affect 
current decisions. 
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Table 3.4 
Experiment One 
Mean Preference Ratings (Standard Deviations) 
Selecting Certain vs. Risky Alternative 
Gain Loss Row 
Condition Condition Average 
Certain 3.77 3.22 3.61 
Outcome 
(1.19) (1.20) (1.20) 
Risky 3.31 3.22 3.25 
Outcome 
(1.11) (1.09) (1.08) 
Column 3.60 3.22 
Average 
(1.17) (1.10) 
Kahneman and Tversky [1981] note that prior gains or losses can complicate the 
decision context. They suggest that current and prior events may be put in separate mental 
accounts so that prior gains or losses have no effect on current decisions, or that prior and 
present gambles may be reflected in the same, more inclusive, account [Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1981]. In effect, there is flexibility in how prospects are edited within PT, 
particularly with respect to how a prior outcome might affect the reference point [Thaler 
and Johnson, 1990, p. 645]. Consequently, decision makers’ behavior in the presence of 
prior gains or losses is open for empirical investigation. Some studies have indicated that 
individuals may be affected by costs that have occurred in the past [Arkes and Blumer, 1985; 
Staw, 1981; Thaler, 1980]. In addition, Thaler and Johnson [1990] suggest that previous 
gains may play a role in current decision making as well. They present initial data 
suggesting that individuals are more willing to take risks in the presence of prior gains, 
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which they refer to as "the house money" effect, and are more likely to be risk averting after 
prior losses, except when risky alternatives can negate those losses (i.e., a break-even effect). 
Hypothesis two formally states the predictions tested in the current experiment. 
Design. The experiment utilized a between subjects manipulation of the gamble 
format and order of presentation. Two groups of subjects received the choice alternatives 
presented as one stage gambles, while two groups responded to an equivalent two stage 
gamble. Within the one and two stage groups, four decision sets were presented in two 
different orders. One-half of the subjects received two gain scenarios followed by two loss 
scenarios, while the other half received the gain and loss scenarios in alternating order, 
beginning with a gain scenario. The following example (using a gain condition) clarifies 
what is meant by one stage and two stage gambles: 
One Stage Gamble 
Evaluate and select one of the following alternatives: 
Alternative A: Sure gain of $50 
Alternative B: A 50% chance to gain $60, and a 50% chance to gain 
$40 
Two Stage Gamble 
Given a prior gain of $50, evaluate and select one of the following alternatives: 
Alternative A: No further gain or loss. 
Alternative B: A 50% chance to gain $10, and a 50% chance to lose 
$10. 
If the prior outcome is simply added to the choice alternatives in the two stage gamble, the 
outcomes for the two stage are equivalent to the one stage gamble. 
As noted, each group was asked to respond to four decision scenarios, two framed 
as gains, and two framed as losses. The relationship between the level of the prior outcome 
and the level of the probabilistic alternatives was varied. That is, given some level ol prior 
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gain (loss), the risky prospect either included a chance of eliminating the entire gain (loss), 
or a chance of only reducing the prior gain (loss). Table 3.5 summarizes the relevant data 
utilized in the experiment, while exhibit 2 of the appendix presents the actual decision 
scenarios given to the subjects. One of the probabilistic outcomes in the first and third 
choice sets reduce the prior outcome, but does not eliminate it, while the second and fourth 
choice sets eliminates the prior gain or loss. As in the other experiments, subjects were 
also asked to indicate their strength of preference for the chosen alternative. 
Note that the decision scenarios of the one stage gambles provide a basic test of PT 
as indicated in Hj. That is, subjects responding to the one stage gambles are expected to 
select the risky outcome (alternative A) more frequently in both of the loss conditions 
(decision sets 1 and 2), and the sure outcome (alternative B) more frequently in the gain 
conditions (decision sets 3 and 4). 
In addition, the experiment extends the analysis to consider the effect of prior 
outcomes. It is hypothesized that significant differences in risk taking and risk averting 
behavior will exist between the one stage and two stage groups. For those subjects receiving 
the two stage presentation, hypothesis two suggests that prior gains will result in increased 
risk taking. Thus, the proportion of subjects selecting the risky alternative is expected to be 
higher in the two stage group than in the one stage group for both gain scenarios. On the 
other hand, prior losses are expected to decrease subjects’ willingness to take risks, unless 
the risky alternative provides an opportunity to breakeven. Thus, the proportion of subjects 
selecting the certain alternative is expected to be higher in the two stage group for decision 
set 1 (risky alternative does not provide the opportunity to break even). When the 
opportunity to breakeven is present (decision set 2), subjects should be more likely to select 
the risk seeking alternative. 
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Table 3.5 
Summary of Decision Scenarios for Experiment Two 
One-Stage Gambles Two-Stage Gambles 
Set Payoff Probability Initial 
Outcome 
Payoff Probability 
1. A: -$375,000 0.6 -$317,000 A: -$58,000 0.6 
-$230,000 0.4 $87,000 0.4 
B: -$317,000 1.0 B: $0 1.0 
2. A: -$390,000 0.6 -$234,000 A: -$156,000 0.6 
$0 0.4 $234,000 0.4 
B: -$234,000 1.0 B: $0 1.0 
3. A: $290,000 0.6 $226,000 A: $64,000 0.6 
$130,000 0.4 -$96,000 0.4 
B: $226,000 1.0 B: $0 1.0 
4. A: $520,000 0.6 $312,000 A: $208,000 0.6 
$0 0.4 -$312,000 0.4 
B: $312,000 1.0 B: $0 1.0 
Results and Discussion. The results of experiment two are presented in table 3.6 
through table 3.8. The first two tables present the total number of subjects (percentage of 
total) which chose either the certain or the risky outcome in the loss and gain conditions, 
respectively. Panels A and B for each table relate to decision sets 1 and 2 for table 3.6, and 
decision sets 3 and 4 for table 3.7. Table 3.8 presents the mean preference ratings for all 
decision scenarios. 
An examination of the one stage condition for the gain and loss scenarios provides 
strong evidence in support of hypothesis one. Decidedly risk taking behavior is observed 
in both of the loss scenarios. In these contexts, approximately 75% of the subjects chose the 
probabilistic outcome over the certain outcome. Table 3.6 reveals the relative proportions 
for panel A as 73.7% risk taking vs. 26.3% risk avoiding (x2=8.526, p = .004), and 75.7% risk 
taking vs. 24.3% risk avoiding for panel B (x2=9.757, p = .002). In addition, approximately 
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78% of the subjects selected the alternative offering the certain profit, thus clearly exhibiting 
risk avoiding behavior. As can seen in table 3.7, the percentage of risk avoiding subjects was 
78.9% vs. 21.1% risk taking in panel A (x2= 12.737, p<.001), while in panel B the 
proportions are 78.4% and 21.6% for risk avoiding and risk taking, respectively (x2= 11.919, 
p = .001). Since the dollar amounts of the outcomes are different in the gain and the loss 
scenarios,14 a direct comparison of these scenarios is not appropriate. However, the range 
of outcomes is similar, and it seems safe to say that the small differences in amounts are 
not confounding the results. The reversal of risk behavior between the gain and the loss 
scenarios is clear and unambiguous. Thus, we see risk taking behavior exhibited by subjects 
when they are presented with possible losses, and risk avoiding behavior by those same 
subjects when the alternatives are presented as potential gains. This series of experiments 
provides strong support of hypothesis one while employing a within subjects design. 
Turning our attention to the two stage condition, we see mixed support for 
hypothesis two. This hypothesis stated that prior losses would result in risk avoiding 
behavior unless the risky alternative offered a chance to eliminate the prior loss, which 
would lead to risk taking. The results presented in table 3.6 indicate that the subjects did 
not simply combine (i.e. subtract) the prior loss and the current gamble, which would result 
in the same investment choice as in the one-stage condition. Significant differences in risk 
taking behavior occurred between one and two stage conditions (panel A overall x2=25.142, 
p<.001; panel B overall x2=28.39, pc.OOl).15 Choice was predominantly risk taking given 
a one stage format in the loss condition. However, when subjects experienced prior losses, 
they were more likely to select the certain outcome, thus behaving in a risk avoiding 
manner. The proportion of managers selecting the certain vs. risky outcomes when the risky 
alternative could not eliminate the prior loss (panel A) was 85.3% vs. 14.7% (x2= 16.941, 
pc.OOl). For panel B, 87.9% of the managers chose the certain outcome, compared with 
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Table 3.6 
Total Number of Subjects (Percentage) 
Selecting Risky vs. Certain Alternative 
in Loss Scenarios 
Panel A: Risky Alternative Cannot Eliminate Prior Loss 
One-Stage Two-Stage Row 
Condition Condition Total 
Risky 28 5 33 
Outcome 
(73.7%) (14.7%) (45.8%) 
Certain 10 29 39 
Outcome 
(26.3%) (85.3%) (54.2%) 
Column 38 34 72 
Total 
(52.8%) (47.2%) (100.0%) 
Panel B: Risky Alternative May Eliminate Prior Loss 
One-Stage Two-Stage Row 
Condition Condition Total 
Risky 28 4 32 
Outcome 
(75.7%) (12.1%) (45.7%) 
Certain 9 29 38 
Outcome 
(24.3%) (87.9%) (54.3%) 
Column 37 33 70 
Total 
(52.9%) (47.1%) (100.0%) 
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Table 3.7 
Total Number of Subjects (Percentage) 
Selecting Risky vs. Certain Alternative 
in Gain Scenarios 
Panel A: Risky Alternative Cannot Eliminate Prior Gain 
One-Stage Two-Stage Row 
Condition Condition Total 
Risky 8 14 22 
Outcome 
(21.1%) (41.2%) (30.6%) 
Certain 30 20 50 
Outcome 
(78.9%) (58.8%) (69.4%) 
Column 38 34 72 
Total 
(52.8%) (47.2%) (100.0%) 
Panel B: Risky Alternative May Eliminate Prior Gain 
One-Stage Two-Stage Row 
Condition Condition Total 
Risky 8 12 20 
Outcome 
(21.6%) (36.4%) (28.6%) 
Certain 29 21 50 
Outcome 
(78.4%) (63.6%) (71.4%) 
Column 37 33 70 
Total 
(52.9%) (47.1%) (100.0%) 
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12.1% selecting the risky alternative (x2= 18.937, pc.OOl). The results indicating risk 
avoidance in panel A of table 3.6 support H2. However, no support exists for risk taking 
when the risky alternative offers the chance to breakeven, as found by Thaler and Johnson 
[1990]. Overall, it appears that prior losses decrease managers’ willingness to take risks 
whether the chance to breakeven exists or not. 
Table 3.7 presents the results for the two gain situations. Panel A refers to a prior 
gain that cannot be eliminated by the risky alternative, while panel B concerns a prior gain 
that can be eliminated. The two stage presentation for both gain scenarios evidenced 
slightly more risk taking than the comparable one stage presentation, however, there was 
no clear indication of risk taking behavior. In both instances, the majority of subjects 
preferred the risk avoiding alternative given the two stage condition (58.8% and 63.6%), 
although chi-square tests revealed no significant differences (58.8% vs. 41.2%, x2= 1-059, 
p = .303; 63.6% vs. 36.4%, X2=2.455, p = .117). Consequently, there is little evidence of a 
"house money" effect as found by Thaler and Johnson.16 
It is interesting to note, however, that there appears to be more risk taking behavior 
in the presence of prior gains as compared to prior losses. The proportion of managers 
selecting the risky alternative in both prior gain situations averaged 39% (41.2% and 36.4%), 
while the average was only 13% (14.7% and 12.1%) in the prior loss situations. This 
suggests that some managers respond differently to similar probabilistic alternatives having 
experienced prior gains versus losses. 
The mean preference ratings for each decision set are presented in table 3.8. In all 
four scenarios there is a significantly higher mean preference rating for the certain 
alternative (p = .037, p = .020, p = .099, p = .008) for panels A through D, respectively, 
indicating that subjects are generally more satisfied with certain alternatives as opposed to 
risky ones. 
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Table 3.8 
Experiment 7Vo: 
Mean Preference Ratings (Standard Deviations) 
| 
One-Stage Two-Stage 
Condition Condition Average 
Loss Scenario 1 
3.43 3.50 3.44 
Risky (1.20) (1.73) (1.24) 
Certain 3.67 4.00 3.92 
(1.58) (1.04) (1.17) 
Loss Scenario 2 
3.43 3.20 3.40 
Risky (1.17) (1.30) (1.17) 
Certain 3.70 4.24 4.10 
(1.16) (0.99) (1.05) 
Gain Scenario 3 
3.63 3.33 3.45 
Risky (1.41) (0.89) (1.10) 
Certain 4.04 4.05 4.04 
(1.05) (1.02) (1.03) 
Gain Scenario 4 
3.75 3.36 3.50 
Risky (1.17) (1.08) (1.10) 
Certain 4.03 4.15 4.08 
(0.93) (0.81) (0.88) 
In summary, the results of this experiment provide further support for hypothesis 
one. That is, subjects exhibit risk taking in the presence of losses and risk avoiding in the 
presence of gains for simple one stage gambles. With respect to the effect of prior 
outcomes, it appears that when managers experience prior investment losses, their behavior 
becomes risk avoiding. Prior investment gains, however, appear to have a minimal impact 
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on choice. Rather than inducing an increase in risk taking behavior consistent with a "house 
money" effect, managers, in general, continued to exhibit a tendency towards risk avoidance. 
Finally, we see evidence in this experiment of a stronger preference for outcomes which 
offer certainty. These results are in contrast to Thaler and Johnson [1990] who, using MBA 
students and very low dollar gambles, found risk taking with prior gains or when a risky 
alternative eliminated a prior loss. The findings of general risk avoidance in situations 
where prior work indicates risk taking may reveal an underlying tendency for risk aversion 
on the part of financial managers. That is, financial managers may tend toward risk 
avoidance unless they are confronted with certain and probabilistic outcomes that are clearly 
in the loss domain. 
Experiment 3: Ruinous Losses 
Another important concern of financial decision makers is the possibility of 
exceptionally large losses that could lead to ruin. It has been suggested that extreme 
outcomes, such as the possibility of bankruptcy in a financial context, impact choice behavior 
[Payne, Laughhunn, and Crum, 1980; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979]. Prospect Theory 
predicts general risk seeking behavior in the presence of losses, however, evidence on 
ruinous losses indicates that decision makers may not take such risks if they involve the 
possibility of overwhelming losses. Hypothesis three indicates that when the possibility of 
bankruptcy is introduced into the domain of losses, risk behavior will change from risk 
seeking to risk averting. That is, in such instances, a decision maker will select the sure loss 
if the probabilistic loss poses the threat of bankruptcy. The following experiment examines 
risk behavior in the presence of ruinous loss conditions. 
Design. The experimental scenario is presented in exhibit 3 of the appendix. 
Subjects were told that their division is faced with severe market conditions which are 
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expected to bring about a net loss of $3 million. If no action is taken, this will represent a 
sure loss. The subjects were asked to consider investing in Product Z, which had a 50% 
chance to produce gains of $6 million, and a 50% chance to result in a loss of $12 million. 
The experiment was conducted with a between subjects design. The numbers and expected 
values were identical in both groups. However, no mention was made of any possible 
liquidity problems or threats of bankruptcy due to the $12 million loss in group one, while 
in group two the possibility of ruinous loss was explicitly raised by the inclusion of the 
following statement: "A loss of $12 million would lead to severe liquidity problems, and raise 
the possibility of bankruptcy" [see Payne, Laughhunn, and Crum, 1980]. 
According to PT, subjects should be risk taking in the domain of losses. Thus, the 
non-bankruptcy group should be more likely to select the investment in project Z. The 
results from this group, therefore, provide an additional test of hypothesis one. By explicitly 
raising the potential of ruinous loss in the bankruptcy group, it is expected that the majority 
of subjects will select the sure loss of $3 million, reflecting risk averting behavior. 
Results and Discussion. Table 3.9 presents the proportion of subjects selecting the 
risky versus certain alternative in each of the experimental conditions. Mean preference 
ratings are presented in table 3.10. 
The results from the non-bankruptcy group once again provide support for PT and 
hypothesis one. There is a clear tendency towards risk taking behavior in the presence of 
losses (68.6% vs 31.4%, x2=4.829, p = .028) when there is no mention of ruinous loss. The 
overall chi-square indicates that managers’ choice of alternative differs between the two 
experimental groups (x2=4.673, p = .030). In general, the consideration of ruinous loss 
affected subjects’ risk taking behavior. The mean transformed preference ratings also 
increased from 5.00 in the bankruptcy group to 6.31 in the non-bankruptcy group (t = 1.69, 
p = .096), indicating an increase in risk avoidance. 
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Table 3.9 
Experiment Three 
Total Number of Subjects (Percentage) 
Selecting Risky vs. Certain Alternative 
Non-Bankruptcy Bankruptcy Row 
Condition Condition Total 
Risky 24 16 40 
Outcome 
(68.6%) (43.2%) (55.6%) 
Certain 11 21 32 
Outcome 
(31.4%) (56.8%) (44.4%) 
Column 35 37 72 
Total 
(48.6%) (51.4%) (100.0%) 
An examination of the bankruptcy group reveals that more subjects chose not to 
invest rather than accept the possibility of bankruptcy (56.8% vs. 43.2%), although this 
difference was not significant (x2=0.676, p = .411). However, an examination of those 
managers who chose the certain loss reveals that they were more likely to have been in the 
bankruptcy rather than the non-bankruptcy condition (x2=3.125, p = .077). Finally, table 3.10 
reveals that the bankruptcy manipulation had little effect on managers preference ratings. 
No significant differences were found between the groups. 
In summary, the possibility of ruinous loss had an effect on risk taking behavior. In 
the absence of ruinous loss, subjects’ behavior conformed to PT (i.e., risk taking in the 
domain of losses). However, when the prospect of ruinous loss was mentioned, there was 
a shift away from risk taking. This suggests that contextual factors can impact the general 
risk taking/avoiding predictions of PT. 
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Table 3.10 
Experiment Three: 
Mean Preference Ratings (Standard Deviations) 
Selecting Risky vs. Certain Alternative 
Non-Bankruptcy Bankruptcy Row 
Condition Condition Average 
Risky 3.21 3.56 3.35 
Outcome 
(1.25) (1.50) (1.35) 
Certain 3.82 3.71 3.75 
Outcome 
(1.17) (1.55) (1.41) 
Column 3.40 3.65 
Average 
(1.24) (1.51) 
Experiment 4: Profits and Expenditures: Certain vs. Risky 
In many professional decision contexts financial managers do not evaluate 
alternatives that are presented strictly in terms of gains or losses. Rather, decisions are 
often made when data are in the form of revenues, profits, costs, expenditures, etc. This 
experiment, and the subsequent two, explores the effect these different constructs have on 
risk behavior. It is reasonable to expect that revenues and profits would be considered in 
the gain domain. In addition, costs and expenditures would likely be evaluated as being 
below a reference point since they represent decreases in the status quo position. However, 
the effect these different forms of business data have on decision frames is open to 
question; they may complicate the prediction of risky behavior. 
Design. Subjects were required to select one of two investment alternatives, the first 
of which provided a certain outcome, the other, a probabilistic outcome. A between subjects 
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design was employed. Exhibit 4 in the appendix presents the decision contexts presented 
to each of the experimental groups. In the first group, the alternatives were presented in 
terms of potential profits. Alternative A yielded a sure profit of $420,000, while alternative 
B represented a 75% chance of a $570,000 profit, and a 25% chance of no profit, resulting 
in an expected value of $427,500. The natural reference point in this condition is zero 
profits. 
Selecting the riskless outcome of $420,000 over the uncertain outcome with greater 
expected value would exhibit risk aversion. By setting the expected value of the risky 
outcome above that of the riskless outcome, the decision maker should have a greater 
incentive to select the risky option. Any preference for the riskless outcome will therefore 
be more clearly attributable to risk aversion. Given the previous research on PT, it is 
expected that managers will select the certain outcome in the profit scenario. 
Subjects in the second experimental condition were asked to choose between two 
alternatives presented as expenditures. The amounts and probabilities were the same as 
those utilized in the profit condition. Expenditures represent outflows of cash; reductions 
in the managers’ current asset position. Thus, it is reasonable to presume that they would 
be viewed as below a relevant reference point. In this experimental scenario, expenditures 
on research and development were considered. Alternative A offered a certain expenditure 
of $420,000, while alternative B represented a 75% chance of $570,000 in expenditures, and 
a 25% chance of no additional expenditures. Thus, the expected value of alternative B is 
an expenditure of $427,500. The choice of alternative B would clearly indicate risk seeking 
preferences, since the expected value for the sure expenditure is higher (i.e. less negative). 
Selecting the certain outcome would indicate risk aversion. Subjects were also asked to 
indicate the strength of their preference for the alternative chosen. 
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Results and Discussion. Table 3.11 presents the number of subjects selecting the 
risky versus the certain alternative in each of the experimental conditions, while table 3.12 
presents the mean preference ratings for each group. The overall chi-square for the data 
in table 3.11 indicates that managers’ choices depend upon experimental condition (x2=6.36, 
p = .012). However, there are important differences between these results and what would 
be expected in clear gain or loss frames. In this experiment a majority of subjects (74.6%) 
opted for the certain outcome across both conditions, while 25.4% selected the risky 
outcome (x2= 17.25, pc.OOl). Thus, there appears to be a clear tendency for risk avoidance 
in this experiment. Consideration of the mean transformed preference ratings provides 
further indication of this overall tendency towards certainty. In the profit condition the 
mean rating is 2.65, while in the expenditure condition the mean is 4.81. Although these 
means are significantly different (t = 3.51, p = .001), they are both below 5.00, indicating that 
Table 3.11 
Experiment Four: 
Total Number of Subjects (Percentage) 
Selecting Certain vs. Risky Alternative 
Profit Expenditure Row 
Condition Condition Total 
Certain 30 23 53 
Outcome 
(88.2%) (62.2%) (74.6%) 
Risky 4 14 18 
Outcome 
(11.8%) (37.8%) (25.4%) 
Column 34 37 71 
Total 
(47.9%) (52.1%) (100.0%) 
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the majority of subjects prefer the certain alternative in both groups. In effect, there does 
not appear to be a clear reflection of preferences between the profit condition and the 
expenditure condition. 
Behavior in the profit condition was clearly in line with the expectations of PT, and 
provides strong support for Ht. About 88% of the managers opted for the certain profit, 
while only about 12% chose the risky alternative (x2= 19.88, p<.001). An examination of 
behavior in the expenditure condition also indicates a tendency towards risk avoiding 
behavior. Approximately 62% of the managers selected the certain expenditure versus 38% 
selecting the probabilistic expenditure. Although not statistically significant (x2=2.19, 
p = .14), this result is distinctly different from the results noted in the loss conditions of 
previous experiments. In those conditions,17 managers typically selected the probabilistic 
alternative, indicating risk taking in the domain of losses. Finally, an examination of the 
data in table 3.12 reveals that managers selecting the certain outcome had significantly 
higher preference ratings than managers opting for the risky alternative (3.66 vs. 3.00, 
t = 1.87, p = .066), once again reflecting a stronger preference for certainty. 
In conclusion, the results of experiment four indicate that while behavior in the profit 
condition is in line with PT (i.e, risk avoiding), the expenditure condition failed to induce 
risk taking behavior as would be expected if the status quo position of current wealth was 
used as a reference point and only the expenditure data was considered. These results 
suggest that it is difficult to predict the risky behavior of decision makers when choices are 
based upon certain types of business data. Profits are closely related to gains. That is, they 
are net figures that represent positive numbers and should therefore induce a gain frame. 
Expenditures directly reduce a managers’ current asset position. If that position is viewed 
as the reference point, and only the expenditure data is considered, expenditures should be 
viewed as a reduction from the reference point and therefore induce risk taking. However, 
63 
Table 3.12 
Experiment Four: 
Mean Preference Ratings (Standard Deviations) 
Selecting Certain vs. Risky Alternative 
Profit Expenditure Row 
Condition Condition Average 
Certain 4.13 3.04 3.66 
Outcome 
(1.04) (1.43) (1.33) 
Risky 3.50 2.86 3.00 
Outcome 
(1.00) (1.23) (1.19) 
Column 4.05 2.97 
Average 
(1.04) (1.34) 
expenditures are not net figures, and may not induce a frame that is below a manager’s 
relevant reference point. That is, managers may view expenditures as essential to generating 
revenues, resulting in a net profit. Therefore, managers may not only consider the 
expenditure data, but may also infer generated revenues from those expenditures, resulting 
in a positive profit reflecting a gain frame. Such a frame would lead to greater risk 
avoidance. These results suggest that managers may exhibit risk taking only if choice 
alternatives involve clear financial losses. 
Experiment 5: Profits and Costs: High Risk vs. Low Risk 
The fifth experiment considers the effect of data presented as costs on the risky 
behavior of managers. As with expenditures, it is reasonable to assume that managers view 
costs as reductions in a current asset position, and therefore view cost alternatives as below 
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a reference point. As in the prior experiment, however, managers’ risky behavior with cost 
data is an issue for empirical investigation. 
Design. The managers were asked to choose between two probabilistic alternatives 
in a between subjects design. The expected values of the alternatives were equal, so 
differences in choice reflect differences in risk preferences, with risk defined as the 
variability of returns. Choosing the alternative with the smaller variance indicates risk 
averting behavior, while selecting the alternative with greater variance represents risk 
seeking. As indicated in hypothesis one, it is expected that decision makers will select the 
less risky alternative when choices are presented in terms of profits. The direction of risk 
behavior is not explicitly hypothesized when the alternatives are described in terms of costs. 
The decision scenarios utilized are presented in exhibit 5 of the appendix. The profit 
scenario involved the possibility of investing in two different products, each of which was 
expected to result in different levels of profit due to varying demand conditions. Product 
A offered a 70% chance to earn $465,000, and a 30% chance to earn $155,000. This is 
paired with product B, which had a 70% probability of yielding a $384,000 profit, and a 30% 
probability of $344,000. In both instances, the expected value is $372,000, but the standard 
deviations are $142,100 and $18,300 for products A and B, respectively. Hypothesis one 
predicts that the majority of subjects will select the less risky alternative (prospect B) in the 
profit condition. 
Subjects in the cost experimental condition were asked to select between two 
different strategies to remove waste products from their production facility. The alternatives 
were expressed in terms of costs required for two different disposal techniques. The 
expected costs varied depending on different conditions or constraints faced by the disposal 
companies. Alternative A presented expected costs of $465,000 with a 70% probability, and 
a 30% chance that costs would be $155,000. The second alternative had expected costs of 
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$384,000 and $344,000 with a 70% and 30% probability, respectively. The outcomes are 
exactly the same as those used in the profit condition. 
Strength of preference measures were also obtained for both conditions, and 
transformed preference ratings were created. Since alternative B represented the low risk 
alternative, the transformed preference rating was adjusted so that a rating of 1 signified a 
strong preference for the low risk outcome (alternative B), and a 10 represented a strong 
preference for the high risk outcome (alternative A). 
Results and Discussion. The number and proportion of subjects choosing each 
alternative for the two experimental groups is presented in table 3.13. Mean preference 
ratings are given in table 3.14. Once again, an overall effect on choice behavior due to 
experimental condition exists (overall x2= 11.89, p < .001). Risk behavior was influenced by 
the presentation format of the alternatives. In the profit condition, behavior is clearly risk 
avoiding, providing support for hypothesis one. Over 86% of the financial managers 
selected the low risk alternative, while only about 14% opted for the high risk alternative 
(x2= 19.70, p<.001). However, choices are about evenly split in the cost condition, with 
about 51% and 49% selecting the high and low risk alternatives, respectively (x2=.029, 
p = .866). Consequently, there is no clear support for overall risk taking with cost data. 
However, a significant increase in risk taking behavior is evident when compared with the 
profit condition (51.4% vs. 13.5%, x2=7.348, p = .007). Therefore, presentation format had 
some effect, but a cost manipulation was apparently not strong enough to result in risk 
taking for most subjects. 
As was observed in earlier experiments, there is an overall tendency towards risk 
avoidance. About 68% of the managers chose the less risky alternative overall, while 32% 
selected the alternative with greater risk (x2=9.389, p = .002). In addition, subjects’ had 
mean transformed preference ratings of 2.59 (S.D. = 2.40) in the profit condition and 5.37 
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Table 3.13 
Experiment Five: 
Total Number of Subjects (Percentage) 
Selecting High Risk vs. Low Risk Alternative 
Profit Cost Row 
Condition Condition Total 
High Risk 5 18 23 
Outcome 
(13.5%) (51.4%) (31.9%) 
Low Risk 32 17 49 
Outcome 
(86.5%) (48.6%) (68.1%) 
Column 37 35 72 
Total 
(51.4%) (48.6%) (100.0%) 
(S.D. = 3.34) in the cost condition. While these means are significantly different (t = 4.07, 
p< .001), they are both less than 5.50, the midpoint of the 10 point scale, indicating that both 
groups had an overall preference for the low risk alternative. 
Table 3.14 presents the mean preference ratings for each of the subject groups. The 
mean preference in the profit condition (4.14, S.D. = 0.92) is significantly higher that the 
mean in the cost condition (3.66, S.D. = 0.94, t = 2.19, p = .032). Overall, preferences were 
also higher for subjects selecting the low risk alternative versus those selecting the high risk 
alternative (4.14 vs. 3.39, t = 3.34, p = .001). 
As in experiment four, information presented in terms of profits resulted in risk 
avoiding behavior. Profits are viewed in the same fashion as gains, and induce the same risk 
behavior. While cost data resulted in more subjects exhibiting risky behavior than when 
subjects were presented with profit data, a clear majority of subjects were still not risk 
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Table 3.14 
Experiment Five: 
Mean Preference Ratings (Standard Deviations) 
Selecting High Risk vs. Low Risk Alternative 
Profit Cost Row 
Condition Condition Average 
High Risk 3.20 3.44 3.39 
Outcome 
(0.84) (0.78) (0.78) 
Low Risk 4.28 3.88 4.14 
Outcome 
(0.85) (1.05) (0.94) 
Column 4.14 3.66 
Average 
(0.92) (0.94) 
taking. Cost data apparently does not induce a frame below a relevant reference point for 
most managers, even though costs are outflows of cash and represent reductions in the 
status quo position. While these data are not as strong as those found in experiment four, 
they support an underlying tendency toward risk avoidance on the part of managers except 
when data are clearly framed as financial losses (as found in experiments two and three). 
Experiment 6: Costs and Revenues: Framing 
As noted, data in financial contexts are often in the form of revenues versus costs. 
Experiment six investigates the evaluation of investment alternatives defined in terms of the 
revenue generated or the cost associated with the venture. As such, the setting provides an 
extension of the framing study presented in experiment one and provides a further 
exploration of the contextual issues developed in experiments four and five. 
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Design. Exhibit 6 of the appendix contains the decision scenarios presented to the 
subjects. The experiment was conducted with a between-subjects design. In the revenue 
condition, subjects were asked to consider two alternative investment projects. Project A 
provided certain revenues of $575,000, while project B offered a 70% probability of $665,000 
in revenue if demand was high, and a 30% probability of $365,000 in revenue if demand was 
low. In both cases, the expected revenue is $575,000, and, given that costs were stated as 
$250,000 for both projects, the expected net profit is identical. Given the correspondence 
between revenues and gains, and the previous research on PT, it is expected that managers 
will act in a risk averting manner and select project A. 
In the second experimental condition, the focus was on the costs of the alternative 
projects. Subjects receiving this scenario were informed that the cost of project A was 
$250,000 with certainty, while project B’s costs varied depending on the price of materials. 
There was a 70% probability of $160,000 in costs, and a 30% probability of $460,000 in costs 
for project B. Subjects were told that revenues were $575,000 for both projects. Both 
alternatives offered an expected net profit of $325,000, the same as in the revenue condition. 
Generally, the manipulation of decision frame in this manner would be expected to produce 
a reversal in risk taking behavior. However, it is unclear how managers respond to 
alternatives presented in the form of costs. 
Results and Discussion. The results for experiment six are presented in tables 3.15 
and 3.16. The overall chi-square indicates that subjects’ choices do not appear to be 
dependent upon experimental condition (overall x2=2.348, p = .125). In the revenue 
condition, 78.4% of the managers selected the certain outcome, while 21.6% selected the 
risky prospect, indicating clear risk avoidance (x2= 11.919, p = .001). This result supports PT 
and Hj. Risk behavior in the cost condition is also in the direction of risk avoidance. About 
62% of the managers chose the certain alternative, while 38% selected the risky alternative, 
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Table 3.15 
Experiment Six: 
Total Number of Subjects (Percentage) 
Selecting Certain vs. Risky Alternative 
Revenue Cost Row 
Condition Condition Total 
Certain 29 21 50 
Outcome 
(78.4%) (61.8%) (70.4%) 
Risky 8 13 21 
Outcome 
(21.6%) (38.2%) (29.6%) 
Column 37 34 71 
Total 
(52.1%) (47.9%) (100.0%) 
although the difference is not statistically significant (x2= 1.882, p = .17). Instead of observing 
a reflection of risk avoidance for revenues and risk taking for costs, it appears that risk 
behavior in the cost condition is similar to that in the revenue condition. An examination 
of the proportion of subjects selecting the certain (risky) alternative across conditions 
supports this claim. There was no significant difference in the proportion of subjects 
selecting the certain outcome (78.4% vs. 61.8%, x2=l-28, p = .258) or the risky outcome 
(21.6% vs. 38.2%, x2= 1.19, p = .275) in the revenue versus the cost condition. In addition, 
mean transformed preference ratings indicate similarities between revenue and cost 
conditions. No significant differences existed between the mean ratings for subjects in the 
revenue condition (3.41, S.D. = 2.96) and cost condition (4.59, S.D. = 3.47),(t= 1.55, p = .126). 
Also, both of these means fall below 5.50, indicating an overall preference for the certain 
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alternative. This preference for risk avoidance is consistent with results found in previous 
experiments. 
The results of the mean preference ratings found in table 3.16 reinforce the 
similarity between revenue and cost conditions. The mean preference ratings are virtually 
identical (3.95 vs. 3.92, t = 0.14, p = .886). Also, there is no significant difference in 
preference between those subjects selecting the certain outcome and those opting for the 
risky outcome (4.02 vs. 3.71, t = 1.19, p = .238). 
In summary, the risk behavior of subjects in experiment six was not significantly 
influenced by the frame of the decision. Behavior was strongly risk avoiding when data was 
presented in terms of revenues, and risk avoiding tendencies were also evident with data in 
the form of costs. Once again, cost data does not appear to induce a below reference 
Table 3.16 
Experiment Six: 
Mean Preference Ratings (Standard Deviations) 
Selecting Certain vs. Risky Alternative 
Revenue Cost Row 
Condition Condition Average 
— 
Certain 4.04 4.00 4.02 
Outcome 
(1.02) (0.89) (0.96) 
Risky 3.63 3.77 3.71 
Outcome 
(1.06) (1.09) (1.06) 
Column 3.95 3.92 
Average 
(1.03) (0.97) 
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point frame that results in risk taking. These results, taken in conjunction with the previous 
experiments, suggest an overall tendency toward risk aversion on the part of financial 
managers across a variety of decision contexts. It appears that alternatives must be strictly 
framed in terms of clear financial losses for risk taking to occur. 
Experiment 7: Multiple Reference Points 
Prospect Theory indicates that decision makers select a single reference point and 
exhibit risk taking below and risk averting above that point. In some decision contexts, 
however, the potential exists for the consideration of more than one point of reference when 
making choices. This issue is quite relevant in financial contexts. For example, it is 
common for financial executives to operate with targets or budgets as well as current levels 
of performance. It is not clear how these potential reference points work, together or 
separately, to influence choice. The purpose of this experiment is to investigate whether 
managers, in general, place more importance on targets set by the firm when evaluating 
risky alternatives, whether the current level of performance, or status quo, is more important 
when evaluating investment choices, or whether both of these potential reference points are 
jointly considered in some manner. The following experimental scenarios are designed to 
address managers’ decision making in the presence of these potential multiple reference 
points. 
Design. The experimental scenarios are presented in exhibit 7 of the appendix. The 
basic context indicated that the manager’s division earned an 8% return on investment last 
year, and that the division was currently operating at an 8% level. In addition, the manager 
was told that the company had set a target performance level of 12% for the current year. 
Reflecting the more typical case, current performance was set below target, and to alleviate 
managers’ concerns about possible negative repercussions due to current below target 
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performance, the subjects were told that current performance equaled last year’s 
performance. Consequently, two reference points were available that are particularly 
relevant to decision contexts faced by financial managers. The subjects were asked to 
respond to eight choice scenarios that represented investment alternatives to be considered 
over the remainder of the year. The scenarios were presented randomly in four different 
versions. 
The outcomes of two scenarios were below both current and target performance, and 
two were above both points. Prospect Theory would indicate risk taking for those below, 
and risk averting for those above, both reference points. Consequently, they provide data 
relevant to Ht as well as H4. In addition, four different scenarios were presented whose 
alternatives fell between the two potential reference points. Some of the alternatives met 
or fell short of the target, while others equaled or exceeded current performance. Table 
3.17 presents the alternatives considered. For example, choice set #2 consisted of a sure 
return of 9%, and an alternative resulting in a 50% probability of earning 8% and a 50% 
probability of achieving 10%. Another choice scenario, #4, yielded a sure return of 11%, 
versus a 75% probability of meeting the target of 12%, and a 25% probability of remaining 
at the current performance level of 8%. The expected value of both alternatives within a 
choice set were equal for all scenarios. 
Subjects selected one alternative for each set, and indicated how strongly they preferred 
the chosen alternative. Subjects’ choices and preference ratings were analyzed to investigate 
whether the managers, in general, selected target or current performance as a reference point, 
or whether they considered both reference points in some fashion. It is hypothesized that 
behavior will be affected by both points of reference. Therefore, subjects should exhibit risk 
taking behavior for alternatives below current performance, risk averting behavior for 
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Table 3.17 
Decision Scenarios Used in Experiment Seven 
4% 5% 6% 
Current 
7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 
Target 
12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 
.5 
i 
#7 .5.5 
*_i i_ 
#2 
* 
.5.5 
i i 
#6 
* 
.5.5 
| L 
#5 
* 
.5 
_l 
.75 
i_ 
#3 
* 
.25 
_i 
.25 
i_ 
#1 
* 
.75 
i 
.75 
i 
#8 
* 
.25 
l 
.25 #4 .75 
*_i 
Each line reflects a choice between a riskless and risky alternative. In each case, 
the asterisk (*) represents the certain outcome, while the end of the lines 
indicate the return on investment and related probability levels for the risky 
alternative. 
alternatives above target performance, and a mixture of both risk seeking and risk averting 
for options between the two performance measures. 
Results and Discussion. Table 3.18 presents the proportion of subjects selecting the 
risky or certain alternative in each of the decision scenarios, while table 3.19 offers the mean 
preference ratings for each of these groups. The scenarios are numbered consistent with 
the ordering presented in exhibit 7 of the appendix and table 3.17. 
The scenarios in which outcomes are above both current and target performance 
conform to the expectations of PT. In both instances, the preferred choice is the certain 
outcome, indicating risk avoiding behavior. In scenario one, 88.9% of the managers selected 
the certain outcome, while 11.1% went with the probabilistic alternative (x2 = 43.55, pc.OOl). 
In scenario five, 75% of the managers chose the certain, while 25% chose the risky, 
alternative (x2= 18.00, pc.OOl). This provides additional data in support of H,. However, 
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when the outcomes were below both the target and current level of performance risk 
behavior was mixed. More managers selected the risky alternative versus the certain option 
in scenario three (60.6% vs. 39.4%, x2=3.169, p = .075). However, the results are split in 
scenario seven. About the same number of managers chose the risky versus the certain 
alternative in this investment scenario (52.8% vs. 47.2%, x2=0.222, p = .637). Consequently, 
risk avoidance occurred in the scenarios above both reference points, and mixed results were 
evident for the scenarios falling below both points. 
The mixed results for scenarios below both reference points support the conclusions 
drawn in the previous experiments. Even though alternatives were below both points, 
subjects were split between risk taking and avoiding when the alternatives were fairly close 
to the reference point (scenario 7). However, a greater proportion of subjects became risk 
taking as the certain option moved further below the current level of performance (scenario 
3). Note that while these alternatives are below both reference points, they still represent 
positive returns on investment. It appears that the expected value of the option has to be 
well below the stated reference point in order to induce risk taking behavior in such 
contexts. This reflects the prior results which indicated clear risk taking only when the 
alternative considered definite financial losses (i.e. negative numbers). Apparently, negative 
consequences have to be significant to switch a manager’s underlying risk avoiding tendency 
to risk taking behavior. 
The scenarios offering outcomes between the two possible reference points indicate 
a split in risk behavior. In three out of four cases (scenarios two, six and eight) there are 
no significant differences between the proportion of financial managers selecting the certain 
versus the risky alternatives (all p>.40). In the fourth scenario there is a significant 
preference for the certain outcome. In this instance, 68.1% selected the certain alternative, 
while 31.9% selected the risky alternative (x2=9.389, p = .002). 
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These data indicate that managers do not key only on a target performance level 
when evaluating choice alternatives. While outcomes above the target exhibited risk 
aversion, outcomes below were not predominantly risk taking. In fact, scenario #4 resulted 
in risk avoidance. In addition, current performance was not an overriding reference point. 
While three of the scenarios above current performance resulted in risk avoidance (#1, 5, 
and 4), a split between risk taking and risk avoiding was observed in the other three (#2, 
6, and 8). Given managers consistent tendency towards risk aversion for above reference 
point alternatives demonstrated in prior experiments, it is reasonable to conclude that 
managers do not solely consider current performance in their decision processes. It appears 
that both potential reference points are considered in some manner. 
As in the other experiments, the interest here was to uncover the overall risky 
tendencies in the subject group. Given this data, it is difficult to determine what underlying 
process is utilized for the joint consideration of these reference points. Do the majority of 
the managers simply average the two reference points and use the resulting mean as the 
relevant reference point? Do the managers select one performance level in one scenario 
and the other performance level in another scenario? Are both performance levels 
simultaneously considered when evaluating choice alternatives? It is unlikely that a simple 
average is used as the reference point since risk avoidance is not predominant in scenario 
six and risk taking in scenario two; similar scenarios on either side of the average of 109c. 
However, it is not possible to determine if the managers selected a different reference point 
for different scenarios, or whether they simultaneously factored in both reference points 
according to an unknown decision function. Determination of the underlying process is left 
for future research. 
An examination of table 3.19 indicates that the mean preference measures for the 
scenarios above both reference points (scenario one (4.63) and scenario five (431)) are 
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significantly higher than the preferences in all other scenarios (all p’s < .09). In addition, the 
mean preferences for the scenarios with lower expected values are typically lower than those 
with expected values in the midrange (e.g. scenarios three and seven are significantly lower 
than scenarios four and six, p<.05). The subjects exhibited stronger preferences as the 
expected values of the alternatives increased. 
In conclusion, the results of the seventh experiment reveal that financial managers 
exhibit risk avoiding behavior when all outcomes are above both potential reference points, 
and are more likely to behave in a risk taking manner only when outcomes are substantially 
below both reference points. They do not, in general, key on one of the two reference 
points and make choice decisions on that basis alone. Rather, they consider both current 
and target performance, although the underlying decision function utilized is left for future 
investigation. 
Perception of Risk Scale Measures 
While a majority of subjects may exhibit risk taking or avoiding in certain contexts, 
individual differences do exist. An assessment of the factors underlying individuals’ risk 
perceptions was made to potentially explain these differences in risky behavior. Subjects 
were asked to respond to twelve scale items. The items assessed the subjects’ perceptions 
of various risk factors that prior research indicated would be particularly relevant to 
financial decision makers [e.g. MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; March and Shapira, 1987; 
Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, 1984]. The question 
considered here is whether the risk behavior observed across the various experimental 
situations can be better understood by correlating an individual’s perception of risk with 
their risk behavior. 
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Subjects were asked to rate how strongly they agreed or disagreed with each of 
twelve statements on seven point scales. Items covered such issues as the controllability of 
risk, the variability of outcomes as a measure of risk, the relationship between risk and 
targets or aspiration levels, the importance of the amount to gain or lose, and the 
importance of the probability of gain or loss in risky decision making. Self reports 
concerning inherent risk taking or risk averting tendencies were also obtained. The 
instrument is reproduced in exhibit 8 of the appendix. 
Results and Discussion. Table 3.20 presents the mean responses on the twelve scale 
items for the entire subject group, as well as the mean responses for subjects who were more 
risk taking or avoiding across the seven experiments conducted (discussed below). A higher 
mean indicates stronger agreement with the particular statement. The overall means furnish 
a composite picture of the managerial group participating in this study. The managers 
generally tended to disagree with the statement that risk taking should be done only if 
necessary (2.68). They did not, on average, consider themselves to be strong risk takers or 
avoiders (4.19). Overall, they felt that risk can be controlled (5.43) and that they posses a 
great deal of knowledge about the risks they are involved with (5.26). They also viewed risk 
to be more in line with the variability of possible outcomes (5.28), although a tendency to 
agree that risk is falling short (4.88) was also evident. 
An examination of subjects’ responses to these items may shed light on possible 
reasons for differences in risk taking or avoiding behavior between the subjects. An overall 
measure of risk behavior was calculated for each subject by taking an average of the 
subject’s transformed preference ratings over the seven experimental scenarios.18 This risk 
measure indicates, on average, whether a subject was a risk avoider (5.00 or below) or a risk 
taker (above 5.00). The subject group was then divided into upper and lower thirds based 
upon this overall measure. The lower one-third (n = 24) were subjects that had a stronger 
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Table 3.20 
Descriptive Statistics 
for Scale Items 
Variable 
Overall 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Lower 1/3 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Upper 1/3 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
I Know a 5.26 5.54 4.87 
Great Deal 
About Risks (1.57) (1.64) (1.77) 
Risk is 4.88 5.04 4.87 
Falling 
Short (1.81) (2.01) (1.77) 
Amount to 4.36 4.33 3.91 
Lose is 
Most Important (1.76) (1.88) (1.78) 
Risks 5.43 5.54 5.26 
Can Be 
Controlled (1.19) (1.14) (1.25) 
I am 4.19 4.29 4.35 
a 
Risk Taker (1.77) (1.99) (1.72) 
Take Risks 2.68 2.67 2.61 
Only If 
Necessary (1.70) (1.81) (1.75) 
Probability 4.01 3.50 4.35 
of Gain 
is Most Important (1.61) (1.89) (1.58) 
Risks are 3.82 3.46 4.00 
Out of My 
Hands (1.83) (2.02) (1.86) 
I am More 4.35 4.29 4.35 
Likely to 
Take Risks (1.50) (1.68) (1.61) 
Amount to 4.24 3.75 4.57 
Gain is 
Most Important (1.58) (1.82) (1.47) 
Risk is 5.28 5.25 5.48 
the 
Variance (1.40) (1.42) (1.44) 
Probability 3.88 3.83 3.39 
of Loss 
is Most Important (1.49) (1.63) (1.47) 
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preference for the risk avoiding alternatives; their overall risk measure ranged from 1.53 to 
4.00. The subjects in the upper one-third (n = 23) had overall risk measures ranging from 
5.65 to 8.12, indicating a stronger preference for risk taking, on average. 
T-tests were performed to determine if these groups differed significantly on any of 
the twelve scale items. In only two instances were the group means significantly different. 
Subjects with risk taking tendencies (i.e. upper one-third) more strongly believed that the 
probability of a gain is an important factor in their evaluation of uncertain situations (4.35 
vs. 3.50, t = 1.66, p = .10). Also, the risk taking group was more likely to agree that the 
amount to gain was an important factor in the evaluation of uncertain situations (4.57 vs. 
3.57, t = 1.68, p = .099). Thus, a general discriminator of risk behavior may be an individual’s 
concentration on the upside potential of alternatives, with risk takers more likely to focus 
on gain aspects than risk avoiders. Correlations of the overall risk measure with each of the 
scale items revealed no significant associations except for the importance of the likelihood 
of a gain (r = + 0.22, p = .06) and the amount of knowledge concerning risks (r = -0.23, p = .05). 
Finally, subjects’ responses to the scale items were analyzed using factor analytic techniques 
to attempt to isolate primary risk dimensions. The first four factors extracted seemed to 
indicate personal assessment of risk taking, gain-related considerations, loss-related 
considerations, and controllability. No significant correlations were found between the 
overall risk measure and the factor scores calculated for each of the four factors. Results 
of a regression analysis were also insignificant; the combined influence of the factors served 
to explain only 6.8% of the variation in the overall risk measure. In conclusion, these results 
indicate that differences in risk taking behavior cannot be adequately explained by 
differences in the subjects’ underlying perceptions of risk. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents a summary and discussion of the research findings. Results 
across the various experiments are integrated and compared to evaluate the research issues 
explored. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the study’s limitations and directions 
for future research. 
The purpose of this study was to empirically investigate the nature of individual 
financial decision making under conditions of risk. The study examined basic propositions 
of Prospect Theory within various business contexts that are typically faced by corporate 
managers. Additional factors that may influence these decisions, such as prior gains and 
losses, ruinous losses, and multiple reference points, were also investigated. A total of seven 
experiments were conducted. Seventy-two financial managers from the New England region 
responded to a research instrument that contained a series of investment scenarios. For 
each scenario, the managers were required to choose one of two potential investment 
alternatives that varied in their degree of risk. Risk taking or avoiding behavior was 
inferred from the subjects’ choices. Table 4.1 summarizes the issues explored, relevant data, 
and findings of the study. 
Discussion of Results 
Risk Taking/Avoiding Behavior 
The first issue investigates whether financial managers exhibit risk behavior in 
accordance with PT. That is, whether risk avoiding is observed above and risk taking below 
reference points. The data presented in Table 4.1 lends support for the hypothesis of risk 
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Table 4.1 
Summary of Results 
Issues Explored Relevant Data Findings 
Is behavior risk Experiment One Save Condition: 
avoiding above a Tendency towards RA, (62.9% vs. 37.1%) 
reference point, 
and risk taking Loss Condition: 
below a reference Greater RT than RA, (75.0% vs. 25.0%) 
point? 
Experiment Two: Profit Condition: 
1-Stage Greater RA than RT in both scenarios 
(78.9% vs. 21.1%) and (78.4% vs. 21.6%) 
Loss Condition: 
Greater RT than RA in both scenarios 
(73.7% vs. 26.3%) and (75.7% vs. 24.3%) 
Experiment Three: Loss Condition: 
Non-Bankruptcy Greater RT than RA, (68.6% vs. 31.4%) 
Experiment Four Profit Condition: 
Greater RA than RT, (88.2% vs. 11.8%) 
Expenditure Condition: 
Tendency towards RA, (62.2% vs. 37.8%) 
Experiment Five Profit Condition: 
Greater RA than RT, (86.5% vs. 13.5%) 
Cost Condition: 
Split in risk behavior, 
(51.4% RT vs. 48.6% RA) 
Experiment Six Revenue Condition: 
Greater RA than RT (78.4% vs. 21.6%) 
Cost Condition: 
Tendency towards RA, (61.8% vs. 38.2%) 
Experiment Seven: Above Both Reference Points: 
#1: Greater RA, (88.9% vs. 11.1%) 
#5: Greater RA, (75.0% vs. 25.0%) 
Below Both Reference Points: 
#3: Greater RT, (60.6% vs. 39.4%) 
#7: Split in risk behavior, 
(52.8% RT vs. 47.2% RA) 
Continued, next page. 
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Table 4.1 (cont.) 
Issues Explored Relevant Data Findings 
Do prior gains 
increase risk 
taking? Do prior 
losses reduce risk 
taking? If there 
is an opportunity 
to negate the 
prior loss is risk 
taking observed? 
Experiment Two Prior Loss Condition: 
Risky alternative can’t eliminate prior loss 
Greater RA than RT (85.3% vs. 14.7%) 
Risky alternative may eliminate prior loss 
Greater RA than RT (87.9% vs. 12.1%) 
Prior Gain Condition: 
Risky alternative can’t eliminate prior gain 
Split in risk behavior, 
(58.8% RA vs. 41.2% RT) 
Risky alternative may eliminate prior gain 
Tendency towards RA (63.6% vs. 36.4%) 
Does the 
possibility of 
ruinous losses 
result in risk 
avoiding 
behavior? 
Experiment Three Non-Bankruptcy Condition: 
Greater RT than RA, (68.6% vs. 31.4%) 
Bankruptcy Condition: 
Split in risk behavior, 
(56.8% RA vs. 43.2% RT) 
Increase in RA behavior when the possibility of 
ruinous loss is mentioned, 
(56.8% vs. 31.4%) 
Is the risk 
behavior of 
managers affected 
by both current 
and target levels 
of performance? 
Experiment Seven Above Both Reference Points: 
#1: Greater RA, (88.9% vs. 11.1%) 
#5: Greater RA, (75.0% vs. 25.0%) 
Between Both Reference Points: 
#2: Split (54.2% RA vs. 45.8% RT) 
#4: Greater RA, (68.1% vs. 31.9%) 
#6: Split (50.7% RT vs. 49.3% RA) 
#8: Split (54.3% RT vs. 45.7% RA) 
Below Both Reference Points: 
#3: Greater RT, (60.6% vs. 39.4%) 
#7: Split, (52.8% RT vs. 47.2% RA) 
avoidance in the presence of gains and risk taking in the presence of losses. However, this 
behavior appears to be affected by contextual factors and underlying behavioral tendencies. 
When alternatives are presented in terms of revenues or profits (e.g. experiment two: one- 
stage, and experiments four, five and six), or when alternatives lie above both potential 
reference points in a multiple reference point task (e.g. experiment seven: scenarios one and 
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five), managers exhibit strong risk avoidance. Information presented in the form of savings 
also produces a tendency towards risk avoiding behavior (e.g. experiment one). In these 
conditions, managers select the certain (or less risky) alternative, providing results clearly 
in support of Ht and PT. 
Definite risk taking behavior is observed when choice contexts are presented in 
terms of clear financial losses that reflect negative returns (e.g. experiment one, experiment 
two: one-stage, and experiment three: non-bankruptcy), or when the alternatives offer 
returns well below alternative potential reference points in a multiple reference point task 
(experiment seven: scenario three). In these cases, managers select the risky alternative as 
predicted by PT. However, when alternatives are presented in the context of costs or 
expenditures (e.g. experiments four, five and six) risk behavior is mixed, and actually tends 
toward risk avoidance. While it is reasonable to assume that costs and expenditures would 
induce risk taking behavior since they represent reductions in a manager’s current asset 
position, it appears that managers do not view costs or expenditures in this light. In a 
similar manner, alternatives that are below both potential reference points, but still 
represent positive rates of return, exhibit risk taking only when the alternatives’ returns are 
well below the reference points (e.g. experiment seven: scenarios three), and not when they 
are only slightly below (e.g. experiment seven: scenario seven). 
These results suggest an underlying tendency towards risk avoidance among financial 
managers. Managers will exhibit risk taking behavior when faced with clearly negative 
alternatives. However, risk avoiding behavior predominates unless alternatives are explicitly 
stated in terms of financial losses, or are well below potential reference points. Thus, while 
a basic proposition of PT is supported by this study, the results suggest that it may be 
difficult to predict the frame of reference managers use when faced with various forms of 
business data. Costs and expenditures directly reduce a manager’s current asset position. 
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Therefore, if that position is taken as the reference point, and only the cost or expenditure 
data is considered, the alternatives should be viewed as below the reference point and 
induce risk taking behavior. It appears that in scenarios dealing with costs and expenditures, 
however, a majority of managers view the outflows in a broader sense. For example, they 
may view costs and expenditures as essential to generating revenues, resulting in a net profit. 
Therefore, managers may not only consider expenditure and cost data, but may infer 
generated revenue (even though that information was not presented to them). A resulting 
positive profit would reflect a gain domain and risk avoidance. In effect, it appears that 
managers generally tend toward risk avoidance unless alternatives clearly reflect negative 
outcomes (e.g. clear financial losses that reflect negative numbers or outcomes substantially 
below alternative potential reference points). 
These findings have important implications for the field of finance. The results 
indicate that a basic proposition of PT is relevant in many financial contexts. Financial 
managers exhibit both risk taking and risk avoiding behavior. These results imply that an 
assumption of risk avoidance should take into consideration the context of the behavior in 
question. For example, when financial managers consider data in the form of profits and 
revenues, strong risk avoidance is evidenced. Also, there is a tendency towards risk 
avoidance when considering cost or expenditure data. In financial decision contexts such 
as these, the assumption of risk avoidance is descriptively valid. However, the consideration 
of clear financial losses results in risk taking. Given that managers exhibit risk taking 
behavior in these contexts, the descriptive validity of models of financial decision making 
may be increased by the explicit consideration of such behavior. When decision contexts 
involve financial losses, a risk taking assumption is more descriptively relevant. 
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Prior Gains and Losses 
The second set of questions deal with the impact of prior outcomes on risky 
behavior. The results of experiment two reveal significant differences in risk taking behavior 
between one and two stage conditions. This implies that prior outcomes are not simply 
combined with current investment alternatives by an additive function. What effect do prior 
outcomes have on risky behavior? Recall that results presented by Thaler and Johnson 
[1990] suggest that subjects’ behavior becomes risk taking in the presence of prior gains, a 
phenomena they termed the "house money" effect. This finding was not supported in the 
present study. As can be seen in table 4.1, prior gains did not result in overall risk taking. 
In fact, there was a slight tendency toward risk avoidance. However, greater risk taking 
occurred in the prior gain conditions as compared to the prior loss conditions. 
With respect to prior losses, Thaler and Johnson [1990] found a tendency toward risk 
avoiding behavior unless the alternative under consideration offered an opportunity to 
eliminate the prior loss. In this case, subjects’ behavior became risk taking, indicating 
breakeven effects. In the present study significantly more risk avoiding behavior occurred 
when managers experienced recent losses. This occurred whether the alternative eliminated 
the prior loss or did not eliminate the loss. Therefore, breakeven effects are not supported 
by the results of this study; prior losses produced risk avoiding behavior regardless of an 
opportunity to recoup the loss. This lends further support for an underlying predisposition 
towards risk avoidance on the part of financial managers as previously discussed. 
It should be noted that the study conducted by Thaler and Johnson [1990] differs 
from the current study in several important ways. First, subjects utilized by Thaler and 
Johnson were undergraduate and MBA students, rather than experienced corporate financial 
managers. Second, the decisions subjects responded to in Thaler and Johnson’s study 
involved outcomes that were substantially lower in value than in the current study, and third, 
88 
the decisions were not set in the context of corporate investment opportunities. These 
variations in design may help to explain the difference in results. It appears that when 
experienced corporate managers respond to business investment settings a different pattern 
of results emerge concerning prior outcomes. This underscores the need to examine the 
decisions of expert decision makers in familiar tasks [Edwards, 1983]. As Smith and Kida 
[1991] note, expert decision makers may use specialized decision strategies in familiar, job 
related tasks. The tendency toward risk avoidance may reflect such a strategy. 
These results provide further support for a risk avoidance assumption in certain 
business decision contexts. However, the slight increase in risk taking in prior gain versus 
prior loss conditions again indicates the effect of contextual factors on risky behavior. In 
effect, to increase their descriptive validity, financial models should take into consideration 
the context of the behavior in question. Building contextual issues into decision making 
models may result in improved decision making if one factors in financial managers’ risk 
preferences into evaluation of their judgments. 
Ruinous Losses 
The third issue explored deals with the consequence of potential bankruptcy on 
financial decision making. Prospect Theory does not explicitly address this issue. Rather, 
it indicates that, generally, behavior should be risk taking in the presence of losses. 
Subsequent research by Laughhunn, Payne, and Crum [1980] has shown that when the 
possibility of ruinous losses are explicitly raised, behavior changes from risk taking to risk 
avoiding. Thus, contextual factors may once again play a role in determining risk behavior. 
The results presented in table 4.1 correspond to those found by Laughhunn, et.al. Greater 
risk taking occurred in loss situations when the losses would not lead to liquidity problems 
than when liquidity problems may occur. This suggests that the possibility of bankruptcy is 
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a contextual factor that can influence risk behavior. Managers conform to PT in the domain 
of losses, as long as the possibility of bankruptcy is not suggested. When ruinous loss is 
salient, many managers become risk avoiding. Such behavior should therefore be considered 
in descriptive models of financial decision making that deal with liquidity problems. 
Multiple Reference Points 
The fourth question concerns the effect of multiple potential reference points on 
risky behavior. Specifically, when evaluating alternatives for possible future investment, are 
managers’ affected by current performance, target performance, or a combination of both 
current and target performance? It appears that both potential reference points do, in fact, 
influence managers’ risk behavior. Table 4.1 presents the results of the seventh experiment 
which indicate that financial managers did not simply select current or target performance 
as a reference point and consistently exhibit risk taking below and risk avoiding above the 
chosen point. Rather, the data indicate a joint consideration of both current and target 
performance on managers’ risky decisions. The manner in which these reference points are 
combined, and possibly interact with an alternative’s probabilities and amounts, is left for 
subsequent research. 
From a financial decision making perspective, these data indicate that both current 
and target performance are important considerations in managers’ risky behavior. The 
results also imply that risky decision making may be more complex than PT would suggest 
in certain decision contexts. When expert decision makers are put in a familiar, job related 
context that involves multiple relevant reference points, the prediction of risky behavior 
becomes problematic. The relative positions of possible alternatives with respect to 
potential reference points may need to be considered when predicting risk behavior. Once 
again, differing contexts relevant to financial decision making affect decision makers’ risk 
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taking and avoiding. The contextual issues highlighted in this study can hopefully lead to 
a more fuller understanding of financial managers’ decision processes, resulting in 
appropriate descriptive models. Consideration of such descriptive models along with 
existing normative models should provide a more complete appreciation of financial decision 
making under conditions of risk. 
Perception of Risk 
Finally, an exploratory investigation was made into managers’ perceptions of risk in 
an attempt to account for individual differences in risky choice behavior. The data reveal 
that managers with greater risk taking tendencies were more likely to feel that the amount 
to be gained and the probability of a gain were important considerations in their evaluation 
of risky situations. In effect, risk taking managers were more likely to focus on the upside 
potential in their consideration of uncertain outcomes as opposed to managers who were 
more risk avoiding in their choice behavior. However, very little variation in risk taking 
behavior was captured by these differences in managers’ underlying perceptions of risk. 
Limitations 
Several limitations must be considered when evaluating the study’s findings. As with 
much experimental behavioral research, the first concerns task realism. To achieve 
adequate experimental control, and to make the tasks manageable, it was necessary to limit 
the information presented to the financial managers. While efforts were made to insure 
that the managers perceived the decision scenarios to be realistic, the data typically 
evaluated for risky capital investment proposals are far more complex than that presented 
in the present study. It was hoped that the managers would view the scenarios as exemplars 
and bring their expertise and personal work experiences to bear when making their choices. 
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This study focused on the risk taking behavior of high level corporate managers who 
were employed in small to medium sized industrial companies in the New England region. 
Thus, the generalizability of the findings to other subject groups may be limited. The risk 
taking behavior of managers in larger corporations may be influenced by factors not relevant 
to smaller organizations. For example, larger organizations may have more centralized 
decision making processes, and capital investment decisions may be made in group settings 
rather than by any one individual. Differences in compensation structure between larger 
and smaller organizations are also likely to exist and may be a factor in risky behavior. 
Investigations to test the generalizability of the results are left for future research. 
An objective of this study was to investigate risky behavior of financial managers in 
contextually relevant decision contexts. The experimental scenarios were designed to 
correspond to situations typically encountered by financial managers. The use of relevant 
business contexts necessarily resulted in a tradeoff between external and internal validity. 
For example, to maintain the contextual appropriateness of the experimental scenarios, the 
profit and expenditure conditions in experiment four and the profit and cost conditions in 
experiment five involved different types of investment. Also, while the use of revenues and 
costs as a relevant business decision frame results in alternatives that are equivalent in terms 
of expected profit in experiment six, the two frames differ in terms of profit margin. In 
effect, analyzing risk taking behavior of financial managers required differences in gain and 
loss scenarios if the scenarios were to be contextually relevant. 
Directions for Future Research 
The results of this study raise specific issues that warrant closer consideration. For 
example, the results indicate that prior gains and losses are not combined with current 
alternatives in a simple additive fashion. However, the manner in which prior outcomes are 
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integrated with current situations is unclear. In a similar sense, the manner in which target 
and current levels of performance are jointly considered is open for future research. Both 
potential reference points appear to impact managers’ investment decisions, however, the 
specific functional form requires additional investigation. 
In general, this study indicates that financial managers comply with basic 
propositions of PT regarding risk taking and risk avoiding behavior, but that their behavior 
is affected by several contextual variables such as the form of business data (i.e. costs, 
expenditures), prior outcomes, ruinous losses, and multiple reference points. The factors 
investigated by this study represent only a selection of possible determinants of risky 
behavior. Continuing research is necessary to identify other influences. It is hoped that 
such investigation would lead to models of financial decision making that reflect greater 
descriptive validity. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. In this study, individual decision making refers to the decisions an individual 
would make in his or her professional capacity. Decision contexts involving risk 
are those in which all possible states are known, but the actual outcome is 
probabilistic. 
2. In a very broad sense, a reference point is any stimulus used to judge or compare 
other stimuli to [e.g. Rosch (1975)]. Possible reference points include; one’s 
current position, what is aspired to, what is expected, or what is fair or 
appropriate in a given situation. Reference points may also be dependent on 
budget constraints or target objectives [Klein and Oglethorpe (1989)]. In PT, the 
reference point is the point used to code outcomes as either gains or losses. 
3. Expected Utility Theory is a generalization of expected value in that it is non¬ 
linear in payoffs. The expected value of an outcome is Exp;. The functional form 
of the payoffs is U(Xj) under EUT rather than simply X;. However, EUT retains 
the property of linearity in probabilities. We will see that further generalizations 
of EUT relax this linearity assumption. 
4. A simple prospect (x,p ; y,q) yields x with probability p, y with probability q, and 
zero with probability 1-p-q. 
5. The St. Petersburg Paradox concerns the fact that most people will pay only a 
small, finite amount of money to participate in a gamble that has an infinite 
expected value. Observing this, Bernoulli reasoned that people must not be 
simply maximizing the expected value of a gamble, but rather, they are attempting 
to maximize some measure of "utility". The utility function Bernoulli proposed 
was logarithmic and exhibited diminishing marginal utility. It was interpreted as 
measuring the intensity of individuals’ preferences for riskless outcomes, and 
resulted in a cardinal measure of utility. 
6. In the von Neumann-Morgenstern approach to utility, the resulting function can 
only be given an ordinal interpretation; it has no particular relationship to an 
individual’s strength of preference or any psychological measure of intensity. 
Fishburn [1989] elaborates on the position of von Neumann-Morgenstern with 
respect to differences in preferences, and Ellsberg [1954] provides an interesting 
consideration of the differences between cardinal and ordinal utility functions. 
7. See Machina (1987) for an alternative viewpoint regarding this issue. 
8. An example of a pair of gambles (A and B) used by Payne et al. is: 
A = (44, 0.5; 0, 0.1; -55, 0.4) 
B = (10, 0.3; 0, 0.5; -15, 0.2) 
This pair, and others like them, have $30 added to all outcomes: 
A’ = (74, 0.5; 30, 0.1; -25, 0.4) 
B’ = (40, 0.3; 30, 0.1; 15, 0.2) 
This is referred to as a positive translation. One of the gambles (B’) has all of its 
outcomes above the target level. 
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The pairs of gambles also have $30 subtracted from all outcomes. The negative 
translation produces gambles such as: 
A" = (14, 0.5; -30, 0.1; -85, 0.4) 
B" = (-20, 0.3; -30, 0.1; -45, 0.2) 
Now gamble B" has all of its outcomes below the target level. 
Outcome amounts for losses and gains ranged from $8 to $86, and probability 
levels were between 0.2 and 0.5. 
9. MacCrimmon and Wehrung [1986] also investigated the investment choices of 
business managers in personal and business decision contexts. The gambles were 
presented in terms of gains rather than losses. Significant risk avoidance was 
found, however, they report greater risk avoidance in the personal investment 
context than in the business investment context. In a separate analysis, 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung presented business managers with a series of decision 
contexts that offered a sure alternative and a probabilistic alternative involving 
two possible outcomes. Managers were asked to write a detailed memo indicating 
their course of action. In addition, they indicated their inclination to take the 
risky course of action using an 11 point scale. Two of the four decision contexts 
involved clear losses, while a third offered mixed outcomes, with a probability of 
a small loss. All three resulted in greater risk taking behavior. Managers only 
exhibited risk avoiding behavior when the decision context involved all positive 
outcomes. An important focus of this study was managers’ attempts to adjust to 
risks. It was found that managers did seek to modify risks by delaying action, 
delegating responsibility for the decision, or asking for additional information. All 
of these actions are attempts to reduce the riskiness of the situation. 
10. When using factor analysis, subjects are typically given a list of highly correlated 
aspects of risk that are thought to make up the important factors individuals 
consider when assessing risk. Based upon their responses of where a particular 
risk fits, a smaller set of primary factors is statistically determined. The judgment 
task requires a preliminary specification of aspects thought to be important to 
perceiving and judging risk, and thus, results are determined in part by the aspects 
included and the types of questions asked. 
11. An external locus of control implies that outcomes depend primarily on chance, 
or luck, or things outside of the direct control of the individual, while an internal 
locus of control suggests that the individual has some ability to determine the 
outcomes. 
12. The companies Standard Industrial Classification codes were within the 2000’s, 
3000’s and 4000’s. 
13. Two versions of the preference scale were pretested. Both were five point scales. 
Version one had endpoints labeled "weakly prefer the chosen alternative" and 
"strongly prefer the chosen alternative", while version two was labeled "strongly 
prefer alternative A" and "strongly prefer alternative B". Results of the pretest 
indicated that subjects viewed the first version as easier to interpret and less likely 
to result in inconsistencies. The first version also provided a greater range of 
preference when combined with the subjects’ choices. 
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14. This difference was necessary due to the within-subject design employed in the 
experiment. 
15. For the first loss scenario, the mean transformed preference rating was 6.95 in the 
one stage condition, reflecting risk taking, and 2.79 in the two stage condition, 
indicating risk avoidance (t = 6.41, pc.001). The second loss scenario had a mean 
rating of 6.82 and 2.71 for the one and two stage presentations, respectively 
(t = 6.29, pc.001), supporting the shift in risk behavior. 
16. For the first gain scenario, the mean transformed preference rating was 3.41 in 
the one stage condition and 4.27 in the two stage condition (t = 1.16, p = .25). The 
second gain scenario provides similar results, with ratings of 3.39 and 4.53 for the 
one stage and the two stage conditions, respectively (t = 1.52, p = .133). 
17. This includes the loss condition from experiment one, the one-stage loss 
conditions from experiment two, and the non-bankruptcy condition from 
experiment three. 
18. Experiment six contained four decision scenarios, while experiment seven had 
eight. Thus, the overall risk behavior measure was obtained by averaging the 
transformed preference rating over seventeen separate scenarios. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Experiment 1: Decision Framing 
Group One - Gain condition 
Due to difficult economic conditions, your division is facing an expected loss of 
$600,000 for the next quarter. You are considering two different alternatives to confront 
this situation. The first course of action would result in a sure savings of $200,000. For the 
second option, you estimate that there is a 1/3 probability of saving the entire $600,000 and 
a 2/3 probability of saving nothing. 
The choice you are faced with may be represented as follows: 
Option A: Save $200,000 for sure. 
Option B: 1/3 probability of saving $600,000, and a 
2/3 probability of saving nothing. 
Which option would you select? 
A B 
Please place an X in the space that best indicates the degree to which you 
prefer the chosen alternative. 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_I_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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Group Two - Loss condition 
Due to difficult economic conditions, your division is facing an expected loss of 
$600,000 for the next quarter. You are considering two different alternatives to confront 
this situation. The first course of action would result in a sure loss of $400,000. For the 
second option, you estimate that there is a 1/3 probability of losing nothing and a 2/3 
probability of losing the entire $600,000. 
The choice you are faced with may be represented as follows: 
Option A: Lose $400,000 for sure. 
Option B: 1/3 probability of losing nothing, and a 
2/3 probability of losing $600,000. 
Which option would you select? 
A B 
Please place an X in the space that best indicates the degree to which you 
prefer the chosen alternative. 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_I_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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EXHIBIT 2 
Experiment 2: Prior Gains and Losses 
Group One - One Stage Gambles 
Presented below are four sets of investment choices. Within each set, the effects on 
profit or loss for two investment alternatives are given. As the corporate executive 
responsible for making these decisions for your division, please select the alternative you 
would prefer to invest in for each investment set. Remember, there is no right or wrong 
answer. Simply select the alternative you would prefer, and indicate how strongly you prefer 
that alternative over the alternative not selected. Consider each set of investments 
independently. 
Investment Set #1 
Alternative A: A 60% chance of a $520,000 profit, and 
a 40% chance of no profit. 
Alternative B: A sure profit of $312,000. 
Which alternative would you select? A_ B 
I_I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
I_I_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
Investment Set #2 
Alternative A: A 60% chance of a $290,000 profit, and 
a 40% chance of a $130,000 profit. 
Alternative B: A sure profit of $226,000. 
Which alternative would you select? A_ B _ 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_i_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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Investment Set #3 
Alternative A: A 60% chance to lose $390,000 profit, and 
a 40% chance to lose nothing. 
Alternative B: A sure loss of $234,000. 
Which alternative would you select? A_ B_ 
I_I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_j_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
Investment Set #4 
Alternative A: A 60% chance to lose $375,000, and 
a 40% chance to lose $230,000. 
Alternative B: A sure loss of $317,000. 
Which alternative would you select? A_ B 
I_I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_I_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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Group Two - Two Stage Gambles 
Presented below are four sets of investment choices. Within each set, the effects on 
profit or loss for two investment alternatives are given. As the corporate executive 
responsible for making these decisions for your division, please select the alternative you 
would prefer to invest in for each investment set. Remember, there is no right or wrong 
answer. Simply select the alternative you would prefer, and indicate how strongly you prefer 
that alternative over the alternative not selected. Consider each set of investments 
independently. 
Investment Decision #1 
Your last few investment decisions have netted a profit of $312,000. You are 
now considering the following alternatives: 
Alternative A: Invest in the project. This investment has a 60% 
chance of a $208,000 net profit, and a 40% 
chance of a $312,000 net loss. 
Alternative B: Do not invest in the project. 
Which alternative would you select? A B 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_l I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
Investment Decision #2 
Your last few investment decisions have netted a profit of $226,000. You are now 
considering the following alternatives: 
Alternative A: Invest in the project. This investment has a 60% 
chance of a $64,000 net profit, and a 40% chance 
of a $96,000 net loss. 
Alternative B: Do not invest in the project. 
Which alternative would you select? A_ B_ 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_I_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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Investment Decision #3 
Your last few investment decisions have netted a loss of $234,000. You are now 
considering the following alternatives: 
Alternative A: Invest in the project. This investment has 
a 60% chance of a $156,000 net loss, and 
a 40% chance of a $234,000 net profit. 
Alternative B: Do not invest in the project. 
Which alternative would you select? A_ B_ 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_I_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
Investment Decision #4 
Your last few investment decisions have netted a loss of $317,000. Now you are 
considering the following alternatives: 
Alternative A: Invest in the project. This investment has 
a 60% chance of a $58,000 net loss, and 
a 40% chance of a $87,000 net profit. 
Alternative B: Do not invest in the project. 
Which alternative would you select? A_ B_ 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_I_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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EXHIBIT 3 
Experiment 3: Effect of Ruinous Losses on Risk Seeking 
Group One - Non-Bankruptcy condition 
Research indicates that your division is faced with increased competition and an 
eroding market share that will result in a certain net loss of $3 million if new income 
sources are not found. Therefore, you are considering investing in project Z, a new 
technology that offers the possibility of great gains, but may also result in significant losses. 
You estimate that project Z offers a 50% chance to make $6 million if things go favorably, 
but there is a 50% chance that the project will fail and you will lose $12 million on the 
project. 
The choice you are faced with may be represented as follows: 
Alternative A: Invest in product Z. This investment has a 50% chance 
of making $6,000,000, and a 50% chance of losing 
$12,000,000. 
Alternative B: Do nothing. Loss of $3,000,000. 
Which alternative would you select? 
A B 
Please place an X in the space that best indicates the degree 
to which you prefer the chosen alternative. 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
J_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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Group Two - Bankruptcy condition 
Research indicates that your division is faced with increased competition and an 
eroding market share that will result in a certain net loss of $3 million if new income 
sources are not found. Therefore, you are considering investing in project Z, a new 
technology that offers the possibility of great gains, but may also result in significant losses. 
You estimate that project Z offers a 50% chance to make $6 million if things go favorably, 
but there is a 50% chance that the project will fail and you will lose $12 million on the 
project. A loss of $12 million would lead to severe liquidity problems, and raise the 
possibility of bankruptcy. 
The choice you are faced with may be represented as follows: 
Alternative A: Invest in product Z. This investment has a 50% chance 
of making $6,000,000, and a 50% chance of losing 
$12,000,000 (a loss of $12 million could result in 
bankruptcy). 
Alternative B: Do nothing. Loss of $3,000,000. 
Which alternative would you select? 
A B 
Please place an X in the space that best indicates the degree 
to which you prefer the chosen alternative. 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_j_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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EXHIBIT 4 
Experiment 4: Profits vs. Expenditures: 
Certain vs. Risky Outcomes 
Group One - Profit Condition 
As manager of capital investments for your division, your task is to evaluate various 
investment proposals. You are considering investing in equipment to produce one of two 
different products. Product A is an established product with stable demand. If this 
alternative is selected, it will result in a sure profit of $420,000. Product B is also being 
considered. This a new product, with uncertain demand. Your staff has determined that, 
based on market research, you have a 75% chance to earn $570,000 and a 25% chance that 
you will earn nothing if product B is marketed. 
The choice you are faced with may be represented as follows: 
Alternative A: A sure profit of $420,000. 
Alternative B: A 75% chance of a $570,000 profit, and 
a 25% chance of no profit. 
Which alternative would you select? 
A B 
Please place an X in the space that best indicates the degree to which you 
prefer the chosen alternative. 
I_I_I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
J_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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Group Two - Expenditure condition 
As manager of capital investments for your division, your task is to evaluate various 
investment proposals. You are considering two alternative programs for research and 
development. Both programs would result in a current loss, however, they are necessary 
steps in the consideration of a larger project being discussed for future implementation. 
Either alternative will achieve your objective. 
The first alternative requires spending an additional $420,000 beyond what is already 
being spent on R&D, while in the second alternative there is a 75% chance that you will be 
required to spend an additional $570,000, and a 25% chance that your current expenditures 
will be adequate, requiring no additional costs to be incurred. 
The choice you are faced with can be represented as follows: 
Alternative A: A certain expenditure of $420,000. 
Alternative B: A 75% chance of $570,000 in expenditures, 
and a 25% chance of no additional 
expenditures. 
Which alternative would you select? 
A_ B_ 
Please place an X in the space that best indicates the degree to which you 
prefer the chosen alternative. 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_I_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
i 
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EXHIBIT 5 
Experiment 5: Profits vs. Costs: 
Two Risky Outcomes 
Group One - Profit Condition 
You are asked to evaluate the following investment proposals concerning two 
products, A and B. Your market research has investigated the demand for the products, 
and it indicates that there is a 70% chance of high demand, and a 30% chance that demand 
will be low, for both products. However, the profits generated from the products differ 
depending upon the demand level. If demand is high, product A will yield a profit of 
$465,000, while if demand is low, profit will be $155,000. Profit for product B will be 
$384,000 if demand is high, and $344,000 if demand is low. 
The alternatives you are faced with may be represented as follows: 
Product A 
Level of Demand Probability Expected Profits 
High 70% $465,000 
Low 30% $155,000 
Product B 
Level of Demand Probability Expected Profits 
High 70% $384,000 
Low 30% $344,000 
Which alternative would you select? 
A B 
Please place an X in the space that best indicates the degree 
to which you prefer the chosen alternative. 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
T I I_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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Group Two - Cost Condition 
Your company is presently considering different procedures that are 
available to comply with government regulations concerning the disposal of 
waste materials that result from your production process. You can choose 
between two different disposal methods. Since the alternatives utilize 
different disposal techniques, their costs can vary depending upon different 
compliance regulations that the methods must meet. An outside consultant 
has determined that, given your level of production, there is a 70% chance 
that alternative A will cost $465,000, and a 30% chance that costs will be 
$155,000. Costs for alternative B have a 70% chance to be $384,000, and a 
30% chance of being $344,000. 
The alternatives you are faced with may be represented as follows: 
Alternative A 
Probability Expected Costs 
70% $465,000 
30% $155,000 
Alternative B 
Probabilitv Expected Costs 
70% $384,000 
30% $344,000 
Which alternative would you select? 
A B 
Please place an X in the space that best indicates the degree 
to which you prefer the chosen alternative. 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_j_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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EXHIBIT 6 
Experiment 6: Costs vs. Revenues: 
Decision Framing 
Group One - Revenue condition 
You are considering investing in either project A or project B. Since the demand 
for product A is stable, it is sure to provide you with revenues of $575,000, while the 
revenues achieved under project B will depend on the level of demand. If demand is low, 
revenues will be $365,000. If demand is high, revenues will be $665,000. Market research 
indicates that their is a 30% probability that demand will be low, and a 70% probability that 
demand will be high. Costs are primarily fixed, and will be $250,000 which ever project you 
select. 
The choice you are faced with may be represented as follows: 
Project A: $575,000 certain revenues. 
Project B: 30% probability of $365,000 in revenues, and a 
70% probability of $665,000 in revenues. 
Which project would you select? 
A B 
Please place an X in the space that best indicates the degree 
to which you prefer the chosen alternative. 
I I I I I I 
weakly 
prefer the 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative chosen alternative 
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Group Two - Cost condition 
You are considering investing in either project A or project B. Project A involves 
a fixed expense of $250,000 which will enable you to meet the required level of production, 
while project B’s expenses will depend on the market conditions for the material needed to 
produce the product. There is a 30% probability that costs will be $460,000 and a 70% 
probability that costs will be $160,000. Whichever project you select, your revenues would 
be $575,000. 
The choice you are faced with may be represented as follows: 
Project A: $250,000 certain costs. 
Project B: 30% probability of $460,000 in costs, and a 
70% probability of $160,000 in costs. 
Which project would you select? 
A_ B_ 
Please place an X in the space that best indicates the degree 
to which you prefer the chosen alternative. 
I_I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
I_I_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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EXHIBIT 7 
Experiment 7; Impact of Multiple Potential Reference Points 
Last year your division earned an 8% return on investment, and you are currently 
operating at an 8% rate of return. In the current fiscal year, your company has set a target 
which would yield a 12% rate of return for your division. 
Given this information, you are now asked to consider the following series of eight 
choice scenarios. Each scenario concerns investment alternatives that you are considering 
for implementation over the remainder of the year. For each scenario, select one of the two 
investments and indicate how strongly you prefer that alternative over the alternative not 
chosen. Please consider each pair of choices independently. 
Scenario 1: Current performance = 8% Target performance = 12% 
Investment A: Certain return of 15% 
Investment B: Return of 12% with .25 probability; 
return of 16% with .75 probability 
Which investment would you select? A_ B _ 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_j_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
Scenario 2: Current performance = 8% Target performance = 12% 
Investment A: Certain return of 9% 
Investment B: Return of 8% with .50 probability; 
return of 10% with .50 probability 
Which investment would you select? A_ B _ 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
J_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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Scenario 3: Current performance = 8% Target performance = 12% 
Investment A: Certain return of 5% 
Investment B: Return of 4% with .75 probability; 
return of 8% with .25 probability 
Which investment would you select? A B 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
J_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
Scenario 4: Current performance = 8% Target performance = 12% 
Investment A: Certain return of 11% 
Investment B: Return of 8% with .25 probability; 
return of 12% with .75 probability 
Which investment would you select? A_ B _ 
I_I 
weakly 
j 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_!_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
Scenario 5: Current performance = 8% Target performance = 12% 
Investment A: Certain return of 13% 
Investment B: Return of 12% with .50 probability; 
return of 14% with .50 probability 
Which investment would you select? A_ B _ 
I_I 
wreaklv 
J 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_j_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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Scenario 6: Current performance = 8% Target performance = 12% 
Investment A: Certain return of 11% 
Investment B: Return of 10% with .50 probability; 
return of 12% with .50 probability 
Which investment would you select? A B 
I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
I_I_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
Scenario 7: Current performance = 8% Target performance = 12% 
Investment A: Certain return of 7% 
Investment B: Return of 6% with .50 probability; 
return of 8% with .50 probability 
Which investment would you select? A_ B _ 
I_I_I_I_I_I 
weakly strongly 
prefer the prefer the 
chosen alternative chosen alternative 
Scenario 8: Current performance = 8% Target performance = 12% 
Investment A: Certain return of 9% 
Investment B: Return of 8% with .75 probability; 
return of 12% with .25 probability 
Which investment would you select? A_ B_ 
I_I_I 
weakly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
_I_I 
strongly 
prefer the 
chosen alternative 
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EXHIBIT 8 
Perceptions of Risk Dimensions 
Listed below are a number of statements that deal with the notion of risk and risky 
behavior. Circle the number that most closely represents your level of agreement with the 
statement. Please respond to every item. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers, 
I’m interested in your professional opinion. 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
2 = Moderately Disagree 
3 = Slightly Disagree 
4 = Neither Disagree nor Agree 
5 = Slightly Agree 
6 = Moderately Agree 
7 = Strongly Agree 
For most decisions that I make in my professional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
capacity, I have a great deal of knowledge about 
the risks involved. 
I think of risk as the possibility that the actual out- 1 
come will fall short of what I would like to achieve. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
The amount that could be lost is the factor I 1 
consider most when evaluating uncertain situations. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is possible to control risk. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In general, I consider myself a risk taker as 
opposed to a risk averter. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Taking risks is something that should be done only 1 
out of necessity. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
The likelihood that a gain will occur is the factor 12 3 
I consider most when evaluating uncertain situations. 
4 5 6 7 
In most risky situations the final resolution of 
uncertainty is out of your hands. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Compared with other managers at my level, I am 1 2 3 
more likely to take risks. 
4 5 6 7 
The amount that could be gained is the factor I 
consider most when evaluating risky situations. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Risk is best described as the variance or variability 1 2 3 4 5 
of the possible outcomes for a given course of action. 
The likelihood that a loss will occur is the factor 1 2 3 4 5 
I consider most when evaluating risky situations. 
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